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INTRODUCTION 
 
Artificial intelligence (AI) is rightly viewed as a transformative 
technology with the potential to bring an extraordinary range of 
benefits. But the very attributes that make AI so powerful, including 
its ability to learn from data and therefore to evolve over time without 
any explicit human input, also give rise to challenges in light of the 
increasing role AI is certain to play in the criminal justice system. In 
this Article, we focus on a set of solutions to address those challenges 
in the context of risk assessments used in relation to criminal 
sentencing. 
We identify a set of three principles that we believe should 
govern the use of AI in this context and that in combination will help 
ensure due process for defendants. The first principle is auditability. 
Whenever an AI algorithm is used to generate a risk assessment, a 
snapshot of the algorithm and of the data it considered as input should 
be acquired and preserved thus guaranteeing its availability for 
potential later examination. The second principle is transparency. This 
means that a company that makes risk assessment software should not 
be able to use trade secret law as a mechanism to block access to 
information about the algorithm and data. Through the use of tools 
such as protective orders, this access can be enabled in a way that both 
respects and preserves a company’s trade secret rights while also 
giving courts, defendants, and other parties with standing a 
mechanism to access the complete set of information used in 
computing a particular risk assessment. The third principle is 
consistency, which refers to ensuring that an AI system does not 
produce materially inconsistent risk assessments at different times for 
defendants with substantially identical profiles. 
In framing the application of AI in criminal justice and other 
fields, it is important to emphasize the difference between algorithms 
generally and algorithms that use AI. Put simply, all AI involves 
algorithms, while most algorithms do not involve AI. The problems 
that can arise with the use of non-AI-based algorithms in relation to 
criminal sentencing (as well as to the criminal justice system more 
broadly and to policing) are well-recognized and have attracted 
significant attention in recent years, spurred in part by several highly 
visible developments.  
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In 2016, ProPublica published a series of reports raising 
concerns about racial bias in software used to assess criminal risk.1 
Also in 2016, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued a ruling in State v. 
Loomis rejecting a defendant’s claim that the use of algorithmic risk 
assessment at sentencing was a violation of due process.2 Both the 
ProPublica reports and the Loomis decision spurred coverage in the 
broader press.3 Another factor in the increased attention to algorithmic 
risk assessments is the American Law Institute’s inclusion in the 2017 
proposed final draft of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing of a section 
on Evidence-based sentencing endorsing the development of 
“actuarial instruments or processes, supported by current and ongoing 
recidivism research, that will estimate the relative risks that individual 
offenders pose to public safety through their future criminal conduct.”4 
The proposed final draft also states that “[w]hen these instruments or 
processes prove sufficiently reliable, the commission may incorporate 
them into the sentencing guidelines.”5 
 
 1. See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the 
Country to Predict Future Criminals. And It’s Biased Against Blacks, PROPUBLICA 
(May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-
in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/V3XP-733V]; Julia Angwin & Jeff Larson, 
Bias in Criminal Risk Scores is Mathematically Inevitable, Researchers Say, 
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 30, 2016, 4:44 PM), https://www.propublica.org/ 
article/bias-incriminal-risk-scores-is-mathematically-inevitable-researchers-say 
[https://perma.cc/RFS7-EDFL]. The ProPublica publication also spurred rebuttals 
both from Northpointe and others taking issue with ProPublica’s claims. See, e.g., 
William Dieterich et al., NORTHPOINTE INC. RESEARCH DEPT., COMPAS RISK. 
SCALES: DEMONSTRATING ACCURACY EQUITY AND PREDICTIVE PARITY 1 (2016) 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2998391/ProPublica-Commentary-
Final-070616.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9HU-KF4K]; see also Anthony W. Flores et al., 
False Positives, False Negatives, and False Analyses: A Rejoinder to “Machine Bias: 
There’s Software Used Across the Country to Predict Future Criminals. And It’s 
Biased Against Blacks,” 80 FED. PROBATION 38, 38 (2016) (arguing that ProPublica’s 
studies contain errors). 
 2. 881 N.W.2d 749, 753 (Wis. 2016). 
 3. See Danielle Citron, (Un)Fairness of Risk Scores in Criminal Sentencing, 
FORBES (Jul. 13, 2016, 3:26 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielle 
citron/2016/07/13/unfairness-of-risk-scores-in-criminal-sentencing/#68eaf1784ad2 
[https://perma.cc/CL2M-ZJKA]; Sam Corbett-Davies et al., A Computer Program 
Used for Bail and Sentencing Decisions Was Labeled Biased Against Blacks. It’s 




 4. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 (AM. LAW. INST., Proposed 
Final Draft 2017). 
 5. Id. 
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Unsurprisingly in light of these developments, there have been 
numerous publications in both the legal academic press and in the 
popular press addressing the issue of algorithms to assess criminal 
risk.6 For example, in a comprehensive editorial introducing a June 
2019 special issue of the International Journal of Law in Context 
including an article titled Law, Liberty and Technology: Criminal 
Justice in the Context of Smart Machines, Roger Brownsword and 
Alon Harel note the concerns raised by “a strategy for crime control 
that relies, first, on a new generation of smart machines that form the 
infrastructure for the risk assessment of individuals and groups and, 
then, on the technological management of that risk[.]”7 
In a 2017 article titled Algorithms in the Criminal Justice 
System: Assessing the Use of Risk Assessments in Sentencing 
published through the Responsive Communities project at the Harvard 
Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society, Danielle Kehl, 
Priscilla Guo, and Samuel Kessler noted that while risk assessment 
algorithms “have the potential to improve sentencing accuracy in the 
criminal justice system and reduce the risk of human error and bias,” 
they can also “reinforce or exacerbate existing biases and . . . 
undermine certain basic tenets of fairness that are central to our justice 
system.”8 
In a 2019 law review article, Sandra Mayson noted the problems 
inherent to prediction, writing with respect to attempts to address 
racial bias in risk assessments that  
[t]he deep problem is the nature of prediction itself. All prediction looks to 
the past to make guesses about future events. In a racially stratified world, 
any method of prediction will project the inequalities of the past into the 
 
 6. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, 
AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 1 (2006); Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 
GEO. L.J. 57, 57 (2018); Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and 
Limits of Predicting Recidivism, 4 SCI. ADV. 1, 1 (2018); Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate 
Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109, 110 (2019); Anne L. Washington, 
How to Argue with an Algorithm: Lessons from the COMPAS ProPublica Debate, 17 
COLO. TECH. L.J. 131, 131 (2018); Charlotte Hopkinson, Note, Using Daubert to 
Evaluate Evidence-Based Sentencing, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 723, 724 (2018).  
 7. Roger Brownsword & Alon Harel, Law, Liberty and Technology: 
Criminal Justice in the Context of Smart Machines, 15 INT’L. J.L. CONTEXT, 107, 113 
(2019) (citations omitted). 
 8. Danielle Kehl et al., Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System: Assessing 
the Use of Risk Assessments in Sentencing, in RESPONSIVE COMMUNITIES PROJECT, 
BERKMAN KLEIN CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 36 
(2017).  
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future. This is as true of the subjective prediction that has long pervaded 
criminal justice as it is of the algorithmic tools now replacing it.9  
There have also been many news articles and commentary pieces in 
the popular press on criminal risk assessment algorithms.10 
Not all of the most relevant legal scholarship dates from after the 
2016 Loomis ruling and the ProPublica reports. In a 2008 law review 
article titled Technological Due Process, Danielle Citron addressed 
the broad (not specifically in the criminal justice context) 
consequences of using algorithms to make decisions, observing that 
“[a]utomation generates unforeseen problems for the adjudication of 
important individual rights. Some systems adjudicate in secret, while 
others lack recordkeeping audit trails, making review of the law and 
facts supporting a system’s decisions impossible.”11 
While some of the publications quoted or cited above mention 
AI, they do not generally focus on AI-specific due process challenges. 
Yet AI, because it can involve dynamic, computer-created algorithms 
that can evolve without any direct human input or oversight, creates 
an additional set of policy and legal issues over and above those 
arising in non-AI contexts. Thus, a core contribution of the present 
Article is to explore the due process challenges that will arise from AI-
 
 9. Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2218 (2019). 
 10. See Ellora Thadaney Israni, When an Algorithm Helps Send You to 
Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/opinion/ 
algorithm-compas-sentencing-bias.html [https://perma.cc/NM4J-KHKX]; Adam 
Liptak, Sent to Prison By a Software Program’s Secret Algorithms, N.Y. TIMES (May 
1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-prison-by-a-
software-programs-secret-algorithms.html [https://perma.cc/SH5J-QVJR]; Frank 
Pasquale, Secret Algorithms Threaten the Rule of Law, MIT TECH. REV. (June 1, 
2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608011/secret-algorithms-threaten-the-
rule-of-law/ [https://perma.cc/XLV2-SZKY]; Matthias Spielkamp, Inspecting 
Algorithms for Bias, MIT TECH. REV. (June 12, 2017), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/607955/inspecting-algorithms-for-bias/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZWJ6-AB8P]; Jason Tashea, Courts Are Using AI to Sentence 
Criminals. That Must Stop Now, WIRED (Apr. 17, 2017), 
https://www.wired.com/2017/04/courts-using-ai-sentence-criminals-must-stop-now/ 
[https://perma.cc/3X63-K896]; John Villasenor & Virgnia Foggo, Algorithms and 
Sentencing: What Does Due Process Require?, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Mar. 21, 
2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/03/21/algorithms-and-
sentencing-what-doesdue-process-require/ [https://perma.cc/3K2N-TE55]; Rebecca 
Wexler, When a Computer Program Keeps You in Jail, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/opinion/how-computers-are-harming-
criminal-justice.html [https://perma.cc/9YZ5-N92B].  
 11. Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U.L. REV. 
1249, 1253 (2008). 
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enabled criminal risk assessments and to present solutions that can 
help to mitigate them.  
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part I 
provides a brief primer on AI, including a discussion of the historical 
context and of the dramatic advances in recent years that have led to 
its increasing adoption by governments and companies.12 Part II 
addresses risk assessments in criminal sentencing and presents an 
explanation of the spectrum of ways in which AI will be used to assess 
criminal risk.13 Part III provides a broad (non-AI-specific) overview of 
key cases that have established the contours of what due process 
requires in relation to information used by a court at sentencing.14 For 
example, as explained in that section, the protections that govern the 
admissibility of evidence at trial are often lacking at sentencing.15 Part 
IV considers the case law arising from challenges to the use of 
algorithm-based risk assessment.16 Though none of these cases are 
specifically focused on AI-based algorithms, they will play an 
important role in shaping how AI-based criminal risk assessments get 
used. Part V introduces the three guiding principles for AI-based 
criminal risk assessment noted briefly above, explaining how each 
would work and why each is essential to due process.17 A final Part 
presents conclusions. 
I. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A PRIMER 
While specific definitions of AI vary, most definitions state that 
AI systems learn from experience. For instance, Brittanica’s online 
entry for Artificial Intelligence explains that AI is the “ability of a 
digital computer or computer-controlled robot to perform tasks 
commonly associated with intelligent beings. The term is frequently 
applied to the project of developing systems endowed with the 
intellectual processes characteristic of humans, such as the ability to 
reason, discover meaning, generalize, or learn from past experience.”18 
Professional services firm, PwC, states in a 2017 report that “AI is a 
 
 12. See infra Part I.  
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See infra Part IV. 
 17. See infra Part V. 
 18. Artificial Intelligence, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/technology/artificial-intelligence 
[https://perma.cc/73QR-Q4NS] (last visited Mar. 27, 2020). 
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collective term for computer systems that can sense their environment, 
think, learn, and take action in response to what they’re sensing and 
their objectives.”19  
While AI has been a topic of academic research for many 
decades, its emergence as a profoundly important technology for 
companies and governments is much more recent. To contextualize 
the issues arising from the use of AI in risk assessments conducted in 
relation to sentencing, this Part gives a brief explanation of how AI 
contrasts with algorithms, provides some background on the history 
of AI, explains some of the data and investment drivers of the rapid 
changes in recent years, and discusses current and emerging 
applications. 
A. The Difference Between Algorithms and AI 
An algorithm is a sequence of steps to move towards a goal.20 
Some algorithms, such as the procedure for adding two numbers, are 
relatively straightforward. Others, such as the algorithm used to form 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) images from electromagnetic 
signals measured in an MRI machine, are extremely complex.21 
However, while these two examples involve algorithms that differ 
greatly in complexity, neither involves artificial intelligence, because 
there is no learning occurring by a computer in either case. A computer 
that adds a thousand pairs of numbers does not become more efficient 
as a result of this experience, and it does not change the algorithm it 
uses to accomplish the task at hand. Similarly, the computer in a 
hospital that generates MRI images does not become more efficient 
with each use, nor does the algorithm used to generate these images 
typically evolve with the production of subsequent images.  
By contrast, an AI algorithm learns from experience, leading to 
changes over time in the nature of the algorithm itself.22 As noted 
 
 19. ANAND S. RAO & GERARD VERWEIJ, SIZING THE PRIZE: WHAT’S THE REAL 
VALUE OF AI FOR YOUR BUSINESS AND HOW CAN YOU CAPITALISE? ii (PWC 2017). 
 20. See John Villasenor, In Defense of Algorithms, SLATE (Dec. 1, 2015, 8:30 
AM), https://slate.com/technology/2015/12/in-defense-of-the-algorithms-that-guide-
tasks-technical-and-mundane.html [https://perma.cc/V2HR-JRT5].  
 21. See id. 
 22. While the details are beyond the scope of this Article, we note that within 
AI there are multiple ways in which an algorithm can learn. See, e.g., Isha Salian, 
SuperVize Me: What’s the Difference Between Supervised, Unsupervised, Semi-
Supervised and Reinforcement Learning?, NVIDIA (Aug. 2, 2018), 
https://blogs.nvidia.com/blog/2018/08/02/supervised-unsupervised-learning 
[https://perma.cc/E5QL-ZJCF].  
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earlier, all AI involves algorithms, while not all algorithms involve AI. 
This distinction is important generally as well as in the context of this 
Article. As far as we are aware, AI algorithms that adapt and evolve 
in the field are not yet in widespread use in criminal risk assessments.23 
However, this is certain to change in the future as companies create 
and market products that seek to leverage the additional potential 
benefits that can be obtained by allowing algorithms to learn, making 
on-the-fly adaptations based on data they have encountered.24 
B. Historical Context 
One of the earliest pioneers in AI was the British mathematician 
and computer scientist, Alan Turing, who in a 1947 lecture to the 
London Mathematical Society said, “What we want is a machine that 
can learn from experience.”25 In 1950, Turing published a paper titled 
Computing Machinery and Intelligence in which he wrote, “I propose 
to consider the question, ‘Can machines think?’”26 While the 
computers of the day were far too rudimentary to take actions that 
could be reasonably characterized as “thinking,” Turing understood 
that future advances would make this question increasingly relevant.27 
The second half of the twentieth century saw important progress 
in computing technology generally as well as its application to AI. 
However, throughout that period AI remained largely a focus of 
academic research with little tangible impact outside the laboratory. 
As a 1988 New York Times article titled Setbacks for Artificial 
Intelligence noted, “Although computers often appear to be intelligent 
in their everyday applications, they generally perform repetitive tasks 
following rigid rules set down by programs. They do not learn or make 
 
 23. The “as far we are aware” caveat is necessary because, due to trade secret 
protections, it is not possible to know the full inner workings of the risk assessment 
algorithms that are in current use in the criminal justice system. However, we have 
seen no indication that AI algorithms that adapt on their own have yet experienced 
widespread adoption in this field. 
 24. See, e.g., Babak Hodjat, Evolutionary Algorithms Are the Living, 
Breathing AI of the Future, VENTUREBEAT (Feb. 13, 2018, 12:20 PM), 
https://venturebeat.com/2018/02/13/evolutionary-algorithms-are-the-living-
breathing-ai-of-the-future [https://perma.cc/H7CD-AWX3].  
 25.  Alan M. Turing, Lecture to the London Mathematical Society (Feb. 20, 
1947). 
 26. Alan M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433, 
433 (1950). 
 27. See id. 
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cognitive decisions, as humans do.”28 The article also highlighted the 
(as of that date) “failure of artificial intelligence to quickly live up to 
its promise of making machines that can understand English, 
recognize objects or reason like a human expert.”29 
One of the most dramatic illustrations of how far both computing 
technology and AI have advanced in recent decades can be found in a 
comparison of chess at two points in time: 1997 and 2017.30 In 1997, 
an IBM computer named Deep Blue beat Garry Kasparov, who was at 
the time the world’s top ranked player, in a six game match.31 Deep 
Blue was not using true artificial intelligence, as it relied instead on a 
“brute force” algorithm that, as an August 1997 article in MIT 
Technology Review explained, “looks as far ahead as it can at all 
possible moves and evaluates the strength of each position according 
to preprogrammed rules.”32 By exploring “200 million positions each 
second,” Deep Blue had sufficient computing power to examine many 
suboptimal moves in the process of searching for a strong move.33 
Deep Blue was the product of years of work by a team of 
researchers at IBM.34 In addition, IBM had hired several chess 
grandmasters as consultants to help provide input on how to program 
Deep Blue.35 Thus, the algorithm running on Deep Blue was developed 
to exploit not only speed but also the knowledge obtained from highly 
expert players. This knowledge was reflected in how the program 
would evaluate the strength of each potential move. 
 
 28. Andrew Pollack, Setbacks for Artificial Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 
1988), https://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/04/business/setbacks-for-artificial-
intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/RP3C-H6JA].  
 29. Id. 
 30. See, e.g., Bruce Weber, Swift and Slahing, Computer Topples Kasparov, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/12/nyregion/swift-
and-slashing-computer-toppls-kasparov.html [https://perma.cc/Y5BE-ACQT]; see 
generally David Silver et al., Mastering Chess and Shogi By Self-Play with a General 
Reinforcement Learning Algorithm, ARIXIV (2017) (providing an overview and 
implications of the AlphaGo Zero algorithm). 
 31. Weber, supra note 30.  
 32. How the Chess Was Won, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 1, 1997), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/400089/how-the-chess-was-won 
[https://perma.cc/5VR3-S86A].  
 33. Id. 
 34. See Deep Blue, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/ 
icons/deepblue/ [https://perma.cc/8X2N-FU2M] (last visited May 31, 2020) (stating 
that “IBM computer scientists had been interested in chess computing since the early 
1950s”).  
 35. See Steven Levy, What Deep Blue Tells Us About AI in 2017, WIRED 
(May 23, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/05/what-deep-blue-tells-
us-about-ai-in-2017 [https://perma.cc/F9V2-N8V3].  
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C. Artificial Intelligence Today 
Fast forward to twenty years later, in 2017, when a Google 
computer named AlphaZero used artificial intelligence to teach itself 
to play chess at a level sufficient to beat the world’s top chess program 
in a matter of hours.36 As the researchers behind AlphaZero wrote, 
“Starting from random play, and given no domain knowledge except 
the game rules, AlphaZero achieved within 24 hours a superhuman 
level of play in the games of chess and shogi (Japanese chess) as well 
as Go, and convincingly defeated a world-champion program in each 
case.”37 While the comparison is not truly apples-to-apples—Deep 
Blue was up against the top human player of 1997, while AlphaZero 
played a top computer chess program of 2017—it nonetheless 
provides a stunning illustration of how advanced AI has become in 
recent years.38 Deep Blue, for all of its (for the era) speed, was 
implementing an approach that was in a sense a human/machine 
collaboration.39 The machine’s contribution was to explore hundreds 
of millions of moves per second.40 The human contribution was 
reflected in the algorithm used by the program running on Deep Blue 
to assign metrics to each of those possible moves.41 
With AlphaZero, by contrast, the human input was far more 
tenuous. AlphaZero was given nothing but the rules of chess and from 
there it learned on its own how to play extraordinarily well through 
the process of playing many games, learning from its mistakes as it 
did so. This is analogous to what a human does—but a human needs 
years to play the many thousands of games necessary to become a top 
chess player. AlphaZero could learn by experience in hours because it 
had the computational power to both play and learn much faster than 
a human. AlphaZero was a true example of AI, in which a computer 
used its own experience to automatically enhance (and in this case, 
develop essentially in its entirety from scratch) an algorithm.42 
Mastery of games such as chess requires a skill level that is both 
extremely high and very domain-specific. But the AlphaZero story 
illustrates a rate of progress in AI that has implications for many 
domains. PwC’s 2017 report titled Sizing the Prize: What’s the Real 
 
 36. David Silver et al., supra note 30. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id.  
 39. See id. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. 
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Value of AI for Your Business and How Can You Capitalise?, 
identified “nearly 300 use cases” for AI.43 AI is ideally suited to 
applications in which there is a lot of data that can be analyzed to 
identify correlations, patterns, and dependencies that can—in theory 
at least—enable more accurate decisions. And in today’s world, we 
are awash in data. To give some idea of the staggering numbers 
involved, consider that according to one estimate, on an average day 
there are 500 million tweets sent, 5 billion searches performed, and 
four petabytes (including 350 million photos) created on Facebook.44 
The total amount of digital data is expected to reach forty-four 
zettabytes in 2020, which is ten times as large as the amount of digital 
data that existed in 2013.45 Of course, quality is different from 
quantity. Sometimes by accident and sometimes by design, data can 
be incomplete, deceptive, unrepresentative, and inaccurate. This 
presents one of the key challenges with any technology—including 
AI—that aims to effectively analyze and harness data. 
The availability of large amounts of data that can be potentially 
harnessed using intelligent, adaptive algorithms is one reason why AI 
has moved beyond the laboratory and is now used in the commercial 
sector by an increasing array of companies.46 Another reason is the 
large and growing investment in AI. As a Forbes article in early 2019 
explained, “Since 2013, VC investments in AI startups had regularly 
increased over the following four years, with a compound annual 
growth rate (CAGR) of about 36%.”47 The rate of growth was even 
higher in 2018: According to the Q4 2018 MoneyTree Report from 
 
 43. Rao & Verweij, supra note 19, at 3. 
 44. See Jeff Desjardins, How Much Data Is Generated Each Day?, VISUAL 
CAPITALIST (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/04/how-much-
data-is-generated-each-day-cf4bddf29f/ [https://perma.cc/P9VN-EACQ]. A petabyte 
is one million gigabytes. Id. 
 45. See id. (noting that the “accumulated digital universe of data” is projected 
to be 44 zettabytes in 2020, up from 4.4 zettabytes in 2013). A zettabyte is one million 
petabytes. Id. 
 46. While it is generally the case that more data leads to better algorithmic 
outcomes, there are exceptions. Under some circumstances, a smaller data set can 
actually lead to better decisions. See, e.g., Cathy O’Neil, Bigger Data Isn’t Always 
Better Data, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 1, 2017, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-03-01/bigger-data-isn-t-always-
better-data [https://perma.cc/EH6J-AULL]. 
 47. Jean Baptiste Su, Venture Capital Funding for Artificial Intelligence 
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PwC and CB Insights, in the United States, “AI-related companies 
raised $9.3B in 2018, a 72% increase compared to 2017.”48 This level 
of investment is spurred by expectations about the economic impact 
of AI. PwC’s Sizing the Prize report predicted that “AI could 
contribute up to $15.7 trillion to the global economy in 2030.”49 In a 
survey of 1,900 company executives across seven countries 
(Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States) published in May 2019, Deloitte reported that 
63% of respondents “say that AI technologies are ‘very’ or ‘critically’ 
important to their business success today” and that in the next two 
years that number will reach 81%.50 
Today, AI underlies Siri’s answers, purchase recommendations 
from Amazon and Netflix, driving decisions made by Tesla, 
interactions with smart speakers such as Alexa, playlists suggested by 
Pandora,51 route mapping in Google Maps, and matching of drivers 
and riders by Uber and Lyft.52 AI will impact an essentially endless 
list of additional applications as well, in fields including agriculture; 
climate modeling; economic forecasting; supply chain optimization; 
defense; education; and policing and criminal justice. Different fields 
will experience adoption of AI at different rates. For some 
applications, such as driverless cars, AI is a core technological 
enabler, and has long been a consideration at the forefront of the minds 
of system designers.53 For applications that have historically been 
addressed using non-AI methods—including risk assessment in 
relation to policing and criminal justice—the biggest AI-related 
impacts lie largely in the future. 
 
 48. PWC & CB INSIGHTS, MONEYTREE REPORT: Q4 2018, at 20 (2019), 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/moneytree-report/moneytree-report-q4-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y7UJ-73TJ]. 
 49. Rao & Verweij, supra note 19, at 3 (noting that “estimated values are 
expressed in real terms at 2016 prices”). 
 50. See Jeff Loucks et al., Future in the Balance? How Countries Are 
Pursuing an AI Advantage, DELOITTE (May 1, 2019), https://www2.deloitte.com/ 
insights/stateofAI-global.html [https://perma.cc/ELD7-ZKAD]. 
 51. See R. L. Adams, 10 Powerful Examples of Artificial Intelligence in Use 
Today, FORBES (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertadams/ 
2017/01/10/10-powerful-examples-of-artificial-intelligence-in-use-today 
[https://perma.cc/W3AB-5YTX].  
 52. See Gautam Narula, Everyday Examples of Artificial Intelligence and 
Machine Learning, EMERJ, https://emerj.com/ai-sector-overviews/everyday-
examples-of-ai/ [https://perma.cc/5A7B-Z9MZ] (last updated Mar. 20, 2020). 
 53. See, e.g., MICHAEL KRÖDEL & KLAUS-DIETER KUHNERT, AUTONOMOUS 
DRIVING THROUGH INTELLIGENT IMAGE PROCESSING AND MACHINE LEARNING 712 
(2001). 
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That said, AI-enabled risk assessment is already in 
(controversial) use for predictive policing, which aims to identify 
people or places deemed likely to be associated with future crimes.54 
In any field where there is lots of data—and criminal justice certainly 
qualifies as such a field—people will seek opportunities to use AI to 
extract as much useful information as possible from that data. 
II. CRIMINAL RISK ASSESSMENT 
Although we focus here on ensuring due process in relation to 
the use of AI in presentence risk assessments, some of the observations 
we present here will also be relevant to other algorithmic (including 
but not limited to AI-based) risk assessments that might be performed 
within the criminal justice system. This includes those done at the 
pretrial stage, which are used to “classify defendants based on their 
flight risk and their threat to community safety,” as well as those 
performed in relation to decisions regarding whether to grant parole.55 
A. Background 
Risk assessment in the American criminal justice system has a 
long history and has been covered in many other publications.56 As 
Monahan and Skeem explain in a 2016 article titled Risk Assessment 
in Criminal Sentencing, during the second half of the nineteenth 
century following the adoption of parole and probation statutes in New 
York and Massachusetts respectively, “The explicit assessment of an 
offender’s risk soon became a central component of criminal 
sanctioning in numerous American jurisdictions.”57 Alicia Solow-
Niederman, YooJun Choi, and Guy Van den Broeck write that “[f]or 
much of the twentieth century, choices about human liberty depended 
on obviously subjective factors” and that “in making bail and 
sentencing determinations, ‘clinical predictions,’ or ‘the largely 
 
 54. See Randy Rieland, Artificial Intelligence Is Now Used to Predict Crime. 
But Is It Biased?, SMITHSONIAN MAG., (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/artificial-intelligence-is-now-used-
predict-crime-is-it-biased-180968337/ [https://perma.cc/CWP4-33K2].  
 55. Charles Summers & Tim Willis, Pretrial Risk Assessment: Research 
Summary, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, at 1 (Oct. 18, 2010), 
https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PretrialRiskAssessmentResearchSummary.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CUC4-KGX2].  
 56. See John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal 
Sentencing, 12 ANN. REV. CLIN. PSYCHOL. 489, 490 (2016). 
 57. Id. 
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unstructured clinical judgment of skilled practitioners,’ was used to 
assess the likelihood of recidivism.”58 Solow-Niederman et al. also 
note that in recent years, algorithmic solutions have gained 
momentum, spurred in significant part by state legislation requiring 
the use of risk assessments.59 And, they observe that “[t]his apparent 
state enthusiasm for algorithmic solutions, however, has met 
mounting public and scholarly debate about the ethical and legal 
propriety of these tools.”60 
The evolution of risk assessment from the ad hoc approaches 
that were common in the twentieth century to the algorithmic solutions 
that have become widespread today is often described in terms of 
generations.61 Brandon Garrett and Monahan explain that:  
[Risk assessment] instruments have evolved from first generation tools, 
consisting in clinical judgment and experience of a decisionmaker, to 
second-generation tools relying on static risk factors (such as criminal 
history, age, and gender), to third generation instruments both looking at 
risks and needs, and both static and dynamic risk factors such as educational 
status, employment; and fourth generation instruments, that provide 
individualized plans based on assessment of static and dynamic factors. A 
fifth generation of these tools may use machine learning techniques to 
predict recidivism in real-time and using far more complex analysis.62 
In the Berkman Klein Center report on Algorithms in the 
Criminal Justice System: Assessing the Use of Risk Assessments in 
Sentencing discussed earlier, Kehl et al. describe a similar 
development trajectory, starting with a “first generation, where risk 
assessment was conducted on a case-by-case basis by correctional 
staff and clinical professionals working in prisons.”63 Kehl et al. write 
that the “second generation of risk assessment tools, which emerged 
in the 1970s, primarily embraced static factors for measuring risk,” 
and “[t]he third generation of risk assessments attempted to solve for 
the shortcomings of static risk factors by considering static and 
dynamic factors in tandem with one another.”64 They further note that 
the fourth generation “builds off of the third generation but . . . 
embraces a more ‘systematic and comprehensive’ approach to 
 
 58. Alicia Solow-Niederman et al., The Institutional Life of Algorithmic Risk 
Assessment, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 705, 710–11 (2019).  
 59. See id. at 715. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. at 706–07. 
 62. Brandon L. Garrett & John Monahan, Judging Risk, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 
439, 451 (2020). 
 63. Kehl, supra note 8, at 8.  
 64. Id. at 9. 
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measuring recidivism and treating offenders based on their specific 
risk factors and characteristics.”65 
This progression is also reflected in the increasing number of 
states that have adopted criminal justice policies relating to the use of 
Risk and Needs Assessment (RNA) tools. According to a September 
2017 publication from the Center for Sentencing Initiatives, which is 
a project of the National Center for State Courts (NCSC), “[o]ver the 
last 10 years at least 18 states have adopted, by statute, administrative 
policy or judicial policy, a state-wide use of RNA at the sentencing 
phase. There are also local jurisdictions using RNA at sentencing in at 
least 5 other states.”66 
For example, Delaware law provides that “upon conviction of 
any person for any crime and before sentencing, the court may” order 
a presentence investigation that “should include administration of an 
objective risk and needs assessment instrument.”67 Under Kentucky 
law, “[s]entencing judges shall consider . . . the results of a defendant’s 
risk and needs assessment included in the presentence investigation . . 
. and [t]he likely impact of a potential sentence on the reduction of the 
defendant’s potential future criminal behavior.”68 In Louisiana, 
“[e]ligibility for presentence investigation assessment shall be limited 
to an adult felony defendant who is otherwise eligible for probation or 
reentry after adjudication of guilt” and who has signed a “complete 
and irrevocable written acknowledgment of the purpose of the 
assessment and waiver of confidentiality over the global risk scores 
contained in the presentence investigation validated risk and needs 
assessment tool.”69 The Louisiana statute further provides that “[t]he 
presentence investigation validated risk and needs assessment tool and 
evaluation report may be utilized by the sentencing court prior to 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, USE OF RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT 
INFORMATION IN STATE SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS 3, 6 n.10 (Sept. 2017), 
https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSI/EBS%20RNA%20brief%20Sep
%202017.ashx [https://perma.cc/92FU-NBLD] [hereinafter NCSC 2017 RNA 
Report] (stating that “the following states have adopted a formal policy to provide 
RNA information to inform sentencing decisions: AL, AK, AZ, AR, DE, ID, IN, KY, 
LA, MT, NE, ND, OH, OK, TN, UT, WV, and WI. Some jurisdictions in other states 
(e.g., CA, CO, IA, TX, and OR) also provide this information to the court”); see also 
State Policies and Legislation, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS (June 2018), 
https://www.ncsc.org/microsites/csi/home/In-the-States/State-Activities/State-
Policies-and-Legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/3CWJ-KFEW] (outlining RNA 
statutes by state). 
 67. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4331 (West 2012). 
 68. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.007(3)(a)–(b) (West 2011).  
 69. LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:326(b) (2014). 
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determining an appropriate sentence, in order to evaluate the 
defendant’s risk of committing future offenses and to reduce the 
recidivism of the defendant.”70 
The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC) 
contracted in 2006 with the Center for Criminal Justice Research and 
the University of Cincinnati to develop the Ohio Risk Assessment 
System (ORAS).71 The DRC website explains that “[t]he ORAS tools 
can be used at pretrial, prior to or while on community supervision, at 
prison intake, and in preparation for reentry just prior to release from 
prison.”72 Ohio law provides that DRC “shall select a single validated 
risk assessment tool for adult offenders” to be used, among other 
things, for sentencing in municipal, common pleas, and county 
courts.73 Under Tennessee law, the sentencing court must consider 
“[t]he result of the validated risk and needs assessment conducted by 
the department and contained in the presentence report,” and the 
sentence must be based on factors including “the validated risk and 
needs assessment.”74 At the federal level, enactment of the First Step 
Act of 2018 led to the development of a new RNA tool to be used by 
the Department of Justice.75 The Prisoner Assessment Tool Targeting 
Estimated Risk and Needs (PATTERN) “contains static risk factors 
(e.g. age and crime of conviction) as well as dynamic items (i.e. 
participation or lack of participation in programs like education or 
drug treatment) that are associated with either an increase or a 
reduction in risk of recidivism.”76 
One of the contradictions in the policy discussion around risk 
assessments arises in relation to the question of how they impact 
sentencing decisions. For example, the NCSC’s Q&A-format website 
titled Use of Risk and Needs Assessment Information asks the 
question, “Are risk and needs assessment scores used by the courts to 
 
 70. Id. § 15:327(a). 
 71. Ohio Risk Assessment System, OHIO DEP’T OF REHAB. AND CORR., 
https://drc.ohio.gov/oras [https://perma.cc/9CQS-X8SQ] (last visited on Mar. 27, 
2019). 
 72. Id. 
 73. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5120.114 (West 2019). 
 74. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-210(b)(8), (f) (2019). 
 75. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115‐391, § 101, 132 Stat. 5194, 5195 
(2018). 
 76. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Announces 
the Release of 3,100 Inmates Under First Step Act, Publishes Risk and Needs 
Assessment System (July 19, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-
justice-announces-release-3100-inmates-under-first-step-act-publishes-risk-and 
[https://perma.cc/R6HU-WMT2]. 
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make decisions about the appropriate severity of punishment?”77 The 
initial portion of the answer is, “No. State courts have disapproved the 
use of such scores as aggravating factors in determining the severity 
of punishment.”78 Yet later on in the same answer, the document states 
that “RNA information may also be a factor in determining whether 
imprisonment should be avoided or scaled back for low risk 
offenders.”79 As a matter of logic, if a “good” risk score can lead a 
sentencing court to issue a lower sentence than it otherwise would 
have, then it cannot be true that the scores have no impact on the 
severity of the punishment. After all, such a system would unfairly 
punish a defendant who is mischaracterized as high risk, and therefore 
fails to receive the shorter sentence that would have accompanied a 
more accurate risk assessment. 
Furthermore, as the citations from various state laws above make 
clear, laws in multiple states specifically require consideration of risk 
scores when determining a sentence.80 Our point is not that 
consideration of risk is inappropriate at sentencing—in fact, done 
properly, it can clearly be beneficial, as it can reduce bias and 
sentencing disparities, as well as increase predictive accuracy.81 
Rather, it is that the policy discussion will be better advanced when it 
is framed with recognition that risk scores are impacting sentencing, 
and therefore that the due process issues that arise in connection with 
ensuring the accuracy of those scores merit increased attention.82 
B. AI-enabled Risk Assessment: A Spectrum of Approaches 
In the future, risk assessments used in relation to criminal 
sentencing will likely be increasingly reliant on algorithms that 
embody AI. As an AI-based algorithm could take many forms, simply 
categorizing an algorithm as involving AI leaves room for wide 
variations.83 Risk assessment tool taxonomies will need to be updated 
to reflect these impending changes. Rather than attempting to 
 
 77. See, e.g., NCSC 2017 RNA Report, supra note 66 at 1, 3. 
 78. Id. at 3. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.007 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 5120.114 (West 2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-210 (1989). 
 81. Solow-Niederman et al., supra note 58, at 711 (describing historical 
recognition of the need to make risk assessment less biased and subjective). 
 82. See id. at 714 (arguing that “[t]he practical stakes” of using risk scores 
“are high” because of their increased use and impact on sentencing in the United 
States). 
 83. See Salian, supra note 22. 
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oversimplify things by defining multiple non-overlapping and 
seemingly contrasting categories (i.e. static vs. dynamic) for AI-
enabled risk assessment tools, it is more flexible and technologically 
accurate to describe them in relation to a spectrum, the two ends of 
which raise different policy and due process concerns.84  
Approaches at one end of the spectrum can be called “static,” in 
the sense that while AI is used in advance of a product’s release during 
the process of developing and tuning a risk assessment tool, once the 
algorithm has been finalized and placed into service, it remains static.85 
Put another way, with static algorithms, the AI is used by the 
manufacturer of the system to help design an algorithm that does not, 
after the design is complete, evolve further on its own.86 This means 
that the algorithm is knowable to the manufacturer, making it at least 
potentially accessible for analysis pursuant to a due process claim.87 A 
manufacturer might nonetheless attempt to block access by citing 
trade secret rights, but that would be a legal obstacle, not a 
technological obstacle.88  
At the other end of the spectrum are solutions that can be called 
“dynamic.”89 This refers to approaches in which AI is built into the 
system so that the algorithm can continuously evolve on its own in 
 
 84. See Aaron D. Kirk, Artificial Intelligence and the Fifth Domain, 80 
A.F.L. REV. 183, 194 (2019) (explaining that AI tasks “exist along spectrums that vary 
across several dimensions”). 
 85. See Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Blackbox and the Failure 
of Intent and Causation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 889, 898 (2018) (“On the most 
inflexible end of the spectrum are AI that make decisions based on preprogrammed 
rules from which they make inferences or evaluate options.”). 
 86. See id. (describing static AI programs that deal with “preprogramed 
rules” and do not develop). 
 87. How easy it would be for the manufacturer to know the algorithm would 
depend on multiple factors, including the extent to which the manufacturer had taken 
affirmative steps to design the system to support outputting a clear, human-readable 
description of the algorithm, including any changes to the algorithm that had occurred 
after it was initially written by human programmers. See id. at 898–99 (describing 
static AI by using the examples of AI that can evaluate chess moves according to a 
scoring formula or school admissions AI that uses a mathematical formula, and how, 
potentially, both the chess scoring formula and school admissions formula could be 
accessed for analysis). 
 88. See Jessica M. Meyers, Artificial Intelligence and Trade Secrets, 11 
LANDSLIDE 17, 20 (2019) (“AI technologies are particularly well suited to protection 
by trade secret.”). 
 89. See Kirk, supra note 84, at 194 (describing the spectrum of AI programs 
as including static and dynamic ends). 
 Artificial Intelligence, Due Process 313 
response to data that it collects.90 This could occur over very short time 
scales.91 For example, consider an AI-based presentencing risk 
assessment system that continuously monitors nationwide news feeds 
and arrest records for information regarding new arrests, looking for 
recidivism examples. If, due to this monitoring, the AI system 
identifies previously unknown statistical correlations that appear to 
impact the recidivism rate for people convicted of a particular crime, 
it might use that information to modify its algorithm for computing 
risk scores for future people convicted of a similar crime. This 
evolution could happen very quickly. Even a single new recidivism 
incident, when pulled into the AI system’s database and used to 
recalculate statistical correlations, could result in an adjustment of the 
numerical parameters that impact risk score computation. 
We are not suggesting that this is necessarily a good way for an 
algorithm to evolve. In fact, there are multiple reasons why it could be 
problematic—including the implicit assumption that people who are 
convicted of “similar” crimes share enough in common that the past 
recidivism rate of some individuals within that group can help predict 
the future recidivism risk of others in that group.92 Rather, we are 
providing an example of what an AI system nonetheless might do, 
either because its original human programmers designed it that way or 
because it made a non-human-influenced decision on its own to 
monitor arrest records and news stories for use as a source of data. 
Because this evolution can occur completely autonomously, it is 
possible that no one—not even the manufacturer of the system—has a 
snapshot of the algorithm in the form that it exists at the moment when 
it is used to calculate a particular risk assessment score. Relative to 
static algorithms, dynamic algorithms pose a more complex set of due 
process issues, since the information regarding the algorithm used to 
compute a person’s score may no longer exist by the time a request for 
it is made many weeks or months after the score was computed.93 Even 
if any legal challenges to obtaining this information were successfully 
 
 90. See Bathaee, supra note 85, at 898 (“For this sort of AI, there are no pre-
programmed rules about how to solve the problem at hand, but rather only rules about 
how to learn from data.”). 
 91. See id. (describing dynamic AI evolving over the course of a chess game). 
 92. See Citron, supra note 3 (describing how Wisconsin’s risk scores are 
based on group probabilities and not individual likelihood of recidivism). 
 93. See Bathaee, supra note 85, at 899 (noting that “the defining 
characteristic of [dynamic AI] is their ability to learn from data” and thus, the 
information used by the AI is ever-changing). 
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overcome by a person raising a due process challenge, the 
technological barrier could be insurmountable. 
Of course, not all AI-enabled risk assessment will be firmly at 
one of these two ends of the “static” to “dynamic” spectrum. An 
algorithm that is updated every six months via an AI-designed 
software upgrade from the manufacturer is not truly static, but it is 
close to the static end of the spectrum. An algorithm that is hosted on 
a cloud server managed by the manufacturer and updated weekly 
based on AI-driven enhancements derived from the collective data 
from all of the manufacturer’s customers is not truly dynamic, but it is 
close to the dynamic end of the spectrum. The broader point is that, 
with respect to due process, asking whether a risk assessment tool uses 
AI will yield an answer that only tells part of the story. If the answer 
is “yes,” there will need to be further questions to identify how AI is 
used, the frequency and extent to which the algorithm is updated, and 
crucially, what steps, if any, are in place to enable snapshots of the 
algorithm to be obtained every time a risk assessment is performed. In 
the present Article, we focus (though not exclusively) on dynamic AI, 
as algorithms that automatically evolve over time raise particularly 
timely and important due process challenges. 
III. DUE PROCESS AND INFORMATION USED AT SENTENCING 
While the issue of due process specifically in relation to AI-
based presentence risk assessments has not been tested in the courts, 
there is a wealth of case law directly relevant to the broader issue of 
due process in relation to information used at sentencing.94 We review 
some of the key case law and its application to AI-based systems here, 
focusing on four themes: (1) accuracy and admissibility of information 
used at sentencing, (2) access by a defendant to information used at 
sentencing, (3) the scientific validity of AI-based presentencing risk 
assessment methods, and (4) the extent to which such approaches 
might inadvertently consider impermissible factors such as race.95 
 
 94. See, e.g., Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948); see also United 
States v. Cook, 550 F.3d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 2008); Stewart v. Erwin, 503 F.3d 488, 
495 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 95. See infra Sections III.A–D. The discussion herein focuses on the aspects 
of sentencing most likely to be impacted by AI. Even without the additional factor of 
AI, sentencing is a complex area of law characterized, among other things, by varying 
levels of discretion. There is an additional set of Sixth Amendment and other 
questions that could be asked in light of the combination of various sentencing 
frameworks with different potential approaches to introducing AI-based risk 
assessments into the sentencing process. 
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A. Accuracy and Admissibility of Information Used at Sentencing 
A defendant has a due process right to be sentenced based on 
information that is not materially inaccurate.96 The landmark 1948 
Supreme Court ruling in Townsend v. Burke is a key reference point 
on this issue.97 As the Sixth Circuit explained when citing Townsend 
in a 2007 decision, “Townsend and its progeny are generally viewed 
as having established a due process ‘requirement that a defendant be 
afforded the opportunity of rebutting derogatory information 
demonstrably relied upon by the sentencing judge, when such 
information can in fact be shown to have been materially false.’”98 The 
Tenth Circuit put it similarly in a 2008 ruling, noting that “the due 
process clause protects a defendant’s right not to be sentenced on the 
basis of materially incorrect information.”99 And, as the DC Circuit 
explained in 1983, “[t]he requirements of due process are not 
suspended with the pronouncement of guilt, but continue to operate in 
the sentencing process. Thus, the sentencing judge may not rely on 
mistaken information or baseless assumptions.”100 A closely related 
concern arises when courts consider unproven allegations, whether 
true or not, at a sentencing hearing.101 This has led federal appeals 
courts to issue rulings vacating sentences and remanding for 
resentencing in cases including United States v. Juwa (in the Second 
Circuit) and United States v. Weston (in the Ninth Circuit). 102 
However, not all instances in which a sentencing court cites 
unproven allegations have been found to violate a defendant’s due 
process rights.103 Williams v. New York was a 1949 Supreme Court 
decision issued one year after Townsend.104 Williams arose from a 
death sentence imposed at a sentencing proceeding in which the judge, 
in addition to referencing the burglary and murder for which the 
 
 96. See Townsend, 334 U.S. at 741 (overturning a criminal conviction based 
on materially untrue information). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Stewart, 503 F.3d at 495 (quoting Collins v. Buchkoe, 493 F.2d 343, 345 
(6th Cir. 1974)). 
 99. Cook, 550 F.3d at 1296. 
 100. United States v. Lemon, 723 F.2d 922, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 101. See United States v. Juwa, 508 F.3d 694, 702 (2d Cir. 2007) (vacating a 
sentence due in part to unproven allegations). 
 102. See id.; United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 634 (9th Cir. 1971). 
 103. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949). 
 104. See generally id. (finding no due process violation during a sentencing 
proceeding). 
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defendant had recently been convicted, also mentioned thirty other 
burglaries allegedly committed by the defendant, but for which there 
had been no conviction.105  
After receiving the sentence, the defendant asserted that his due 
process rights had been violated by the judge’s consideration of 
unproven crimes.106 The Supreme Court disagreed, writing that  
[i]n determining whether a defendant shall receive a one-year minimum or 
a twenty-year maximum sentence, we do not think the Federal Constitution 
restricts the view of the sentencing judge to the information received in open 
court. The due-process clause should not be treated as a device for freezing 
the evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold of trial procedure. So to 
treat the due-process clause would hinder if not preclude all courts—state 
and federal—from making progressive efforts to improve the administration 
of criminal justice.107  
The Williams Court also cited the historical distinctions between the 
procedural protections at trial and at sentencing, noting that  
[t]ribunals passing on the guilt of a defendant always have been hedged in 
by strict evidentiary procedural limitations. But both before and since the 
American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England 
practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide 
discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in 
determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits 
fixed by law.108  
Williams is sometimes portrayed as having narrow scope 
because, as the Ninth Circuit put it in citing Williams in its Weston 
ruling, Williams had “urged that sentencing should be turned into a 
second trial” and also failed to object to the judge’s citation at the 
sentencing hearing of the unproven crimes.109 But the extensive dicta 
in Williams underscoring the notion that due process protections are 
lower at sentencing hearings than at trial is consistent with multiple 
more recent lower court decisions. 
For instance, consider the exclusionary rule, which (subject to a 
“good faith” exception) prohibits the introduction at trial of evidence 
obtained in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights.110 By 
 
 105. See id. at 244. 
 106. See id. at 245. 
 107. Id. at 251. 
 108. Id. at 246. 
 109. United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1971). 
 110. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (“If letters and 
private documents can thus [without a warrant] be seized and held and used in 
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, 
declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, 
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contrast, multiple federal appeals courts have concluded that the 
exclusionary rule has little force at all at sentencing. This includes the 
Tenth Circuit in 2001 in United States v. Ryan,111 the Seventh Circuit 
in 2000 in United States v. Brimah,112 and the First Circuit in 2002 in 
United States v. Acosta.113 
Even when law enforcement has intentionally violated a 
defendant’s constitutional rights in order to obtain information 
intended to secure a longer sentence, courts have sometimes been 
unwilling to apply the exclusionary rule.114 In Acosta, the First Circuit 
noted that multiple other circuits had “left open the possibility that the 
exclusionary rule will still apply if there is an indication that the police 
violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights with the intent to 
secure an increased sentence.”115 Against that backdrop, the First 
Circuit went no further, writing “[w]e leave open the question of 
whether the exclusionary rule would bar the use of evidence when 
police intentionally act in violation of the Fourth Amendment in order 
to increase a defendant’s sentence.”116 
On the other side of the ledger it is possible to cite the Ninth 
Circuit’s 1968 Verdugo v. United States decision, in which the court 
concluded that “where, as here, the use of illegally seized evidence at 
sentencing would provide a substantial incentive for unconstitutional 
searches and seizures, that evidence should be disregarded by the 
 
so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the 
Constitution.”); see also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349 (1987) (“The application 
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objectively reasonable reliance on a statute would have as little deterrent effect on the 
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reasonable reliance on a warrant.”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) 
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search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.”); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 651 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to state courts). 
 111. 236 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he extension of the 
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effect on the police.”). 
 112. 214 F.3d 854, 858 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Against the backdrop of the 
traditionally broad sentencing inquiry, and the congressional mandate in U.S.S.G. § 
3116 that courts consider all relevant information in sentencing, the detrimental 
effects of applying the exclusionary rule at sentencing are obvious.”). 
 113. 303 F.3d 78, 86 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[W]e hold that the exclusionary rule 
does not bar the use of evidence seized in violation of a defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment rights in sentencing.”). 
 114. See, e.g., id. at 85. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 86. 
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sentencing judge.”117 Yet in United States v. Kim in 1994, the Ninth 
Circuit acknowledged the “factual similarities” with Verdugo but 
arrived at the opposite conclusion.118  
Yet another reference point in assessing the sort of information 
that is admissible at sentencing is the Supreme Court’s 1972 United 
States v. Tucker decision.119 Tucker had been sentenced at a 
proceeding in which “the District Judge conducted an inquiry into the 
respondent’s background, and . . . gave explicit attention to . . . three 
previous felony convictions.”120 However, several years after the 
sentencing, two of the earlier convictions were found to be 
“constitutionally invalid.”121 Tucker then challenged the validity of the 
sentence.122 The Supreme Court agreed, writing that “if the trial judge 
. . . had been aware of the constitutional infirmity of two of the 
previous convictions, the factual circumstances of the respondent’s 
background would have appeared in a dramatically different light at 
the sentencing proceeding.”123 
As the above case citations make clear, while there are some 
defendant-favorable decisions like Tucker and Verdugo, there is also 
a substantial body of case law underscoring the lower level of 
protection at sentencing hearings.124 This is also reflected in rules of 
evidence at the federal level and in multiple states.125 The Federal 
Rules of Evidence contain an exception stating that (other than with 
regard to privilege) they do not apply to sentencing proceedings.126 In 
addition, the Supreme Court has “authoriz[ed] the consideration of 
offender-specific information at sentencing without the procedural 
 
 117. 402 F.2d 599, 613 (9th Cir. 1968). 
 118. See United States v. Kim, 25 F.3d 1426, 1434 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that, 
in contrast with Verdugo, “the opposite result . . . is proper in the instant case”). 
 119. 404 U.S. 443, 443 (1972). 
 120. Id. at 444. 
 121. Id. at 445. 
 122. See id. (stating that Tucker challenged the validity of his sentence). 
 123. Id. at 448. 
 124. Compare Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 614 (9th Cir. 1968), 
and Tucker, 404 U.S. at 445, with United States v. Ryan, 236 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th 
Cir. 2001), United States v. Brimah, 214 F.3d 854, 858 (7th Cir. 2000), and United 
States v. Acosta, 303 F.3d 78, 86 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 125. See ILL. R. EVID. 1101(b)(3) (underscoring the lower level of protection 
at sentencing hearings); IND. R. EVID. 101(d)(2) (underscoring the lower level of 
protection at sentencing hearings); WIS. STAT. § 911.01(4)(c) (1973) (underscoring 
the lower level of protection at sentencing hearings). 
 126. See FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3) (identifying sentencing as a proceeding to 
which “these rules—except for those on privilege—do not apply”). 
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protections attendant at a criminal trial.”127 And, commentary in the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission’s 2016 Guidelines Manual states that 
“[i]n determining the relevant facts, sentencing judges are not 
restricted to information that would be admissible at trial.”128  
At the state level there is significant variation on the extent to 
which evidentiary protections that apply at trial are also used at 
sentencing.129 For example, in Texas, the rules of evidence apply at 
sentencing hearings.130 In Wisconsin, Illinois, and Indiana, they do 
not.131 This can have direct consequences in relation to risk 
assessments. In Malenchik v. State in 2010, the Indiana Supreme Court 
considered a challenge to “the admissibility of assessment tool results 
at sentencing on grounds of alleged lack of scientific reliability under 
Indiana Evidence Rule 702.”132 The court then noted that the “Indiana 
Rules of Evidence, except with respect to privileges, do not apply in 
trial court sentencing proceedings” and explained that “sentencing 
proceedings are exempted from the rules of evidence ‘to provide the 
trial judge with the widest range of relevant information in reaching 
an informed decision.’”133  
In Virginia, the application of the rules of evidence is 
“mandatory” in some types of sentencing proceedings (including 
capital murder sentencing hearings) and “permissive” in others.134 
 
 127. See Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 400 (1995). 
 128. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2004) [hereinafter U.S.S.G. MANUAL]. 
 129. Compare TEX. R. EVID. 101(e) (suggesting that the rules of evidence 
apply during sentencing), with ILL. R. EVID. 1101(b)(3) (stating that the rules of 
evidence do not apply during sentencing). 
 130. See TEX. R. EVID. 101(e) (indicating that sentencing is not among the 
exceptions to which the rules of evidence—other than in relation to privilege—do not 
apply). 
 131. See WIS. STAT. § 911.01(4)(c) (stating that the rules are inapplicable—
except in relation to privilege and some narrow admissibility carveouts such as results 
of an HIV test—to sentencing proceedings); ILL. R. EVID. 1101(b)(3) (noting that—
except in relation to privilege—the rules are inapplicable in sentencing proceedings); 
IND. R. EVID. 101(d)(2) (noting that—except in relation to privilege—the rules are 
inapplicable in sentencing proceedings). 
 132. 928 N.E.2d 564, 573 (Ind. 2010); see also IND. R. EVID. 702 (addressing 
“Testimony by Expert Witnesses”). 
 133. Malenchik, 928 N.E.2d at 573, 574 (citing Dumas v. State, 803 N.E.2d 
1113, 1121 (Ind. 2004)). 
 134. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 2:1101 (noting that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided 
by statute or rule, adherence to the Rules of Evidence (other than with respect to 
privileges) is permissive, not mandatory, in the following situations: (1) Criminal 
proceedings other than (i) trial, (ii) preliminary hearings, (iii) sentencing proceedings 
before a jury, and (iv) capital murder sentencing hearings”). 
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Washington State’s rules of evidence contain a provision stating that 
they “need not be applied” at sentencing proceedings.135 In New 
Jersey, the rules of evidence (other than with respect to privilege) 
“may be relaxed . . . to admit relevant and trustworthy evidence in the 
interest of justice . . . [in] proceedings in a criminal or juvenile 
delinquency action in which information is presented for the court’s 
use in exercising a sentencing or other dispositional discretion.”136  
The upshot is that at the federal level and in many states, the 
rules of evidence disfavor the defendant in relation to sentencing, 
leaving significant uncertainty about what, if any, evidentiary 
protections actually apply. And, at both the federal and state levels, 
the jurisprudence regarding the admissibility and accuracy of 
information at sentencing hearings is inconclusive. Advocates of 
defendants’ rights can cite cases such as Townsend, Tucker, and their 
progeny.137 And—importantly with respect to the specific issue of 
presentence risk assessments—there are the procedural protections of 
Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires 
that a defendant be given the presentence report (and thus any risk 
assessment contained within the report) “at least 35 days before 
sentencing unless the defendant waives this minimum period” and 
states that “[w]ithin 14 days after receiving the presentence report, the 
parties must state in writing any objections, including objections to 
material information . . . contained in or omitted from the report.”138 
And while Rule 32 states that the court “may accept any undisputed 
portion of the presentence report as a finding of fact,” it also says that 
the court “must—for any disputed portion of the presentence report or 
other controverted matter—rule on the dispute or determine that a 
ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not affect 
sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in 
sentencing.”139  
On the other hand, there are numerous rulings, including some 
cited above, that highlight the lack of protection against the 
introduction of unreliable or improperly obtained information at 
 
 135. See WASH. R. EVID. 1101(c) (stating that “[t]he rules (other than with 
respect to privileges, the rape shield statute and ER 412) need not be applied” to (as 
identified in (c)(3)) sentencing). 
 136. See N.J. R. EVID. 101(a)(2), (a)(2)(C). 
 137. See generally United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972) 
(implementing a defendant favorable decision); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 
(1948) (implementing a defendant-favorable decision).  
 138. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e)(2), 32(f)1. 
 139. Id. at 32(i)(3)(A)–(B). 
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sentencing. In the aggregate, the case law and the patchwork state-by-
state variations in the applicability of the rules of evidence at 
sentencing (and the lack of such applicability in the federal courts) 
leave no doubt that the level of due process protection is lower at 
sentencing than at trial, while also creating very little clarity regarding 
how much lower it is.  
So, what does this all mean in terms of the presentence risk 
assessments that are output by AI-based systems? Defendants clearly 
have a due process right not to be sentenced based on a risk assessment 
that is materially inaccurate. But how should that determination be 
made? Risk assessments are inherently probabilistic—for example, 
classifying a defendant’s level of risk on a numerical scale 
representing highest risk at one end of the scale and lowest risk at the 
other. This means that it would be possible to explore inaccuracy over 
a sufficiently large group and given a sufficiently long amount of time. 
For example, if there is a group of 100 defendants identified by a 
particular risk assessment algorithm as having high risk to recidivate 
(while not incarcerated), and after many years only five of them 
actually do, then it is easy to conclude that the algorithm’s designation 
of “high risk” was inaccurate. But when considering only the 
evaluation of a single individual defendant, without the broader 
context of the overall statistical performance of the algorithm, no such 
conclusion can be drawn.  
The goal of avoiding material inaccuracies also raises important 
definitional challenges of what is meant by “materially inaccurate” in 
relation to the use of AI. The large data sets used to both train and run 
AI algorithms will rarely be completely accurate.140 That raises the 
question of whether there should be any sort of metric applied to the 
input data to indicate its accuracy, and even if such a metric could be 
developed and successfully applied, what standards should be used to 
determine materiality of any defects. There are also additional 
complexities introduced when data from multiple data sets are 
combined, perhaps in ways that might either attenuate or amplify the 
impact of inaccuracies in the data.141  
 
 140. See, e.g., SHARAD GOEL, RAVI SHROFF, JENNIFER SKEEM, & CHRISTOPHER 
SLOBOGIN, THE ACCURACY, EQUITY, AND JURISPRUDENCE OF CRIMINAL RISK 
ASSESSMENT 7 (2018) (noting that “[m]any have expressed skepticism that risk 
assessments can ever be fair, as the training data necessarily contain inaccuracies, 
some of which arise through biases in past human actions”). 
 141. Mathematically, one way to indicate the potential presence of 
inaccuracies is through confidence intervals. However, this raises multiple challenges. 
First, it will not always be clear how to calculate confidence intervals, leading to what 
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Another challenge is that the burden of proof to show inaccuracy 
lies with the defendant.142 In the case of a static risk assessment 
algorithm—that is, an algorithm that remains unchanged over many 
years and is used to evaluate a large number of defendants over that 
time span—a defendant with the benefit of years of prior data might 
be able to show that the historical outputs from that algorithm have 
been statistically inaccurate. But with AI—or at least the subset of AI 
systems in which the algorithm is constantly evolving—this becomes 
impossible. The algorithm used today might be different from the one 
that was used last year, or last week. This makes it very hard to do any 
sort of historical accuracy testing in relation to probabilistic risk 
determinations, even when those determinations might in fact be, 
probabilistically speaking, inaccurate. 
A defendant not only has a due process interest in the accuracy 
of the algorithm’s output, but also in the accuracy of the information 
used to generate that output. This includes not only the defendant-
specific data (e.g., the specific crime for which he or she has been 
convicted) that is input to the algorithm, but also the algorithm itself. 
To take an unrealistic but illustrative example, consider an algorithm 
that has a defect in the software such that any defendant who is 
identified as having committed a crime in a zip code ending in the 
number “3” is automatically bumped up to a higher risk category.143 
Clearly, this would be manifestly unfair, and would be a blatant 
violation of due process. It might also be an algorithmic defect that 
was unknowable to the defendant due to the secrecy considerations we 
discuss next. 
B. Secrecy of Information Used at Sentencing 
What are the due process issues arising when a sentencing 
proceeding makes use of secret information—that is, information to 
 
would likely be highly divergent opinions on what those intervals should be. Second, 
a risk assessment is already a probabilistic statement, and we are not convinced it 
would simplify things to overlay yet another layer of complexity by adding confidence 
intervals. 
 142. Courts will only adopt risk assessment algorithms that they believe to be 
accurate. Stated another way, the choice by a court to adopt a risk assessment 
algorithm of necessity conveys that the court has concluded, correctly or otherwise, 
that it is accurate. Neither the prosecution nor the court have any incentive to 
challenge the accuracy of the algorithm. Such a challenge, if it is raised, will come 
from the defendant. 
 143. In constructing in this example, we are assuming that the last digit of the 
zip code is a completely random number with no correlation to recidivism. 
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which the defendant is not given access? Given that, as discussed in 
the prior section, a defendant has a right to be sentenced based on 
information that is not materially inaccurate, logic would seem to 
dictate that the secrecy question should be largely moot. After all, to 
exercise the right to challenge information as materially inaccurate, a 
defendant must be able to access that information. Unfortunately, the 
case law regarding a defendant’s right to access information used at 
sentencing is only partially consistent with this conclusion.144 
In exploring this issue further, it is instructive to start with 
Gardner v. Florida, a 1977 Supreme Court decision that, while 
unrelated to algorithms, directly addressed the issue of a defendant’s 
right to access information used at sentencing.145 In January 1974, 
Gardner was sentenced to death by a Florida state court after being 
convicted of first-degree murder.146 The judge’s decision to impose the 
death penalty—rather than the life sentence recommended by the 
jury—was based in part on information included in a presentence 
investigation report.147 Though Gardner’s counsel had been given a 
copy of some portions of the report, other parts were considered 
confidential, and were not disclosed to his counsel before 
sentencing.148 After the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the 
sentencing court’s decision, Gardner filed a petition with the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which vacated Gardner’s sentence and remanded the 
case for resentencing.149  
Writing for the plurality in Gardner,150 Justice Stevens 
acknowledged the constitutional challenges raised by “a capital-
sentencing procedure which permits a trial judge to impose the death 
sentence on the basis of confidential information which is not 
disclosed to the defendant or his counsel.”151 The plurality also 
observed that “[f]rom the point of view of society, the action of the 
sovereign in taking the life of one of its citizens . . . differs 
dramatically from any other legitimate state action” and that “the 
 
 144. See generally Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (addressing the 
issue of a defendant’s right to access information used at sentencing). 
 145. See id. 
 146. See id. at 353. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See id. at 351. 
 149. See id. at 362. 
 150. The plurality opinion was written by Justice Stevens and joined by 
Justices Powell and Stewart. See id. at 351. In addition, Chief Justice Burger and 
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and White issued concurrences, and Justices Marshall 
and Rehnquist issued dissents. See id. at 362–71. 
 151. Id. at 358. 
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sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy the 
requirements of the Due Process Clause.”152 
Noting that “if [confidential information] is the basis for a death 
sentence, the interest in reliability plainly outweighs the State’s 
interest in preserving the availability of comparable information in 
other cases,” the plurality concluded “that petitioner was denied due 
process of law when the death sentence was imposed, at least in part, 
on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or 
explain.”153 Furthermore, the plurality noted that 
[e]ven if it were permissible to withhold a portion of the report from a 
defendant, and even from defense counsel, pursuant to an express finding 
of good cause for nondisclosure, it would nevertheless be necessary to make 
the full report a part of the record to be reviewed on appeal.154  
Justice Stevens also wrote that 
consideration must be given to the quality, as well as the quantity, of the 
information on which the sentencing judge may rely. Assurances of secrecy 
are conducive to the transmission of confidences which may bear no closer 
relation to fact than the average rumor or item of gossip, and may imply a 
pledge not to attempt independent verification of the information received. 
The risk that some of the information accepted in confidence may be 
erroneous, or may be misinterpreted, by the investigator or by the 
sentencing judge, is manifest.155 
Gardner was clearly hostile to secrecy, but there is also a 
question regarding its scope. It could be argued that Gardner is limited 
to capital cases. A proponent of this argument might cite the Court’s 
1972 opinion in Morrissey v. Brewer, which considered “whether the 
requirements of due process in general apply to parole revocations.”156 
The Court not only concluded that due process did apply to that 
particular action, but also wrote more generally that “[o]nce it is 
determined that due process applies, the question remains what 
process is due.”157 The Court explained that “the concept of due 
process is flexible,” reflecting “a recognition that not all situations 
calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of 
procedure.”158  
 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 359, 362. 
 154. Id. at 361. 
 155. Id. at 359. 
 156. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
 157. See id. 
 158. Id. 
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Thus, Morrissey makes clear that due process can mean different 
things in different contexts. And it is beyond any doubt that capital 
cases merit the highest level of due process protections. But that is not 
the end of the story. After all, it would belie logic to assert that the 
Gardner plurality’s statement that “the sentencing process, as well as 
the trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process 
Clause” is relevant only to capital cases.159 Due process is clearly a 
requirement of sentencing proceedings in non-capital cases, though 
what exactly that means is open to debate. 
Gardner can be juxtaposed with the multiple circuit court rulings 
(in non-capital cases) that have underscored that a defendant does not 
have a right to access all information used at sentencing. For instance, 
in United States v. Headspeth in 1988, the Fourth Circuit addressed a 
defendant’s assertion that “his due process rights were violated when 
he was denied access to the portion of the presentence report that 
contained the probation officer’s sentencing recommendation.”160 The 
Fourth Circuit disagreed, writing that 
[w]hile a convicted defendant retains a due process right not to be sentenced 
on the basis of materially false or inaccurate information, access to the 
sentencing recommendation, which is nothing but a subjective judgment 
made on the basis of facts contained elsewhere in the report, is not necessary 
to vindicate that interest.161  
In United States v. Baldrich in 2006, the Ninth Circuit reached a 
similar conclusion.162 Baldrich “argue[d] that the district court violated 
his right to due process at sentencing by denying his motion to disclose 
the probation officer’s confidential sentencing recommendation” and 
“that Rule 32(e)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is 
unconstitutional to the extent it allows the court to withhold the 
recommendation.”163 The court ruled against Baldrich, writing that 
“Rule 32’s requirement that all facts relevant to the defendant’s 
sentence be provided to the defendant for adversarial testing clearly 
extends to the factual information underlying a probation officer’s 
confidential sentencing recommendation, even though the 
 
 159. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358. 
 160. 852 F.2d 753, 755 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 161. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 162. 471 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 163. Id. at 1111. Rule 32(e)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
states: “By local rule or by order in a case, the court may direct the probation officer 
not to disclose to anyone other than the court the officer’s recommendation on the 
sentence.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e)(3). 
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recommendation itself need not be disclosed.”164 The court also found 
that  
all of the facts in the confidential sentencing recommendation were 
discussed in the presentence report or in open court at the sentencing 
hearing. Therefore, the district court’s decision not to disclose the 
confidential recommendation to Baldrich did not violate Rule 32 or 
Baldrich’s due process rights. We also reject Baldrich’s argument that the 
district court must disclose the probation officer’s confidential analysis and 
opinions.165 
Thus, Headspeth and Baldrich (and Rule 32(e)(3)) indicate that 
a defendant does not have a due process right to obtain information 
about recommendations and opinions presented to a court in relation 
to sentencing.166 But what about the facts underlying those 
recommendations and opinions? Unfortunately, at least some federal 
appeals courts have suggested that an incomplete disclosure of the 
facts might be acceptable. As the Ninth Circuit wrote in 2015 in 
United States v. Eyraud, “[t]o date, no circuit . . . has concluded that 
the Due Process Clause requires full disclosure of all the information 
relied on by a court at sentencing.”167 A similar view was articulated 
by the Sixth Circuit in 2007:  
[W]e do not read Townsend and its progeny as having clearly established 
the considerably broader principle . . . that all information relied upon by a 
sentencing court must be disclosed to the defendant, whether or not it is 
later determined to be materially false. To the contrary, the federal appellate 
courts that have considered this issue have uniformly concluded that 
Townsend and Tucker do not recognize such a federal due process right to 
full disclosure.168 
The secrecy question is particularly important in relation to AI-
based presentence risk assessment algorithms, which will often be 
proprietary, as the companies that design and sell them want to retain 
a competitive advantage in the market. By definition, a proprietary AI 
algorithm is secret, including—at least unless and until a court orders 
otherwise—from the defendant it is being used to evaluate. A risk 
assessment algorithm—whether it uses AI or not—takes in data and 
then performs mathematical analysis of that data in order to provide a 
 
 164. Baldrich, 471 F.3d at 1114. 
 165. Id. at 1114–15. 
 166. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e)(3) (“By local rule or by order in a case, the 
court may direct the probation officer not to disclose to anyone other than the court 
the officer’s recommendation on the sentence.”). 
 167. 809 F.3d 462, 471 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 168. Stewart v. Erwin, 503 F.3d 488, 495 (6th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in 
original). 
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risk assessment. AI adds the additional wrinkle that the form of 
mathematical analysis that gets conducted can change over time.  
For each of these factors—the input data, the nature of the 
analysis performed on it, the way that analysis evolves over time, and 
the resulting risk assessment—the question could be asked regarding 
a defendant’s right of access under due process. The case law 
discussed above provides at least a reasonable (though certainly not 
ironclad) argument that the defendant has a due process right to access 
facts considered at sentencing to ensure that they are not materially 
inaccurate, while also indicating that the defendant may have little or 
no right to recommendations derived from those facts. The input data 
(e.g., the crime for which the defendant has been convicted, any 
previous convictions, the defendant’s age, etc.) constitute facts. Thus, 
these data fall in the category of information the defendant should 
have a right to know, and to challenge if there are inaccuracies.  
But what about the algorithm itself, i.e., the nature of the analysis 
performed on the input data? And what about the AI aspects of the 
system, which govern the way that analysis evolves over time? Or the 
risk assessment output by the algorithm and presented to the court at 
sentencing? Our view is that blocking any of this information from a 
defendant who seeks it is a violation of due process, as it prevents the 
defendant from evaluating the potential impact of flaws in the analysis 
that could lead to a significant overstatement of risk.  
As a counterargument to our conclusion, it could be suggested 
that if an AI algorithm is fair,169 then the details of how it operates no 
longer matter. In other words, this counterargument would hold that if 
a defendant is informed that an algorithm is operating in a way that 
upholds due process, then he or she no longer has any need to know 
its inner workings. We are skeptical of this counterargument, for at 
least the reason that it would require the defendant to rely on the 
dubious assumption that the person or entity providing the assurances 
had performed an analysis free from any oversights that might have 
led to an overly optimistic conclusion regarding algorithm fairness. 
Another concern is that the dynamic nature of AI means that even an 
algorithm that was problem-free (however that might be defined) at 
one point in time might no longer be so in the future. In addition, in 
the context of predictions used in criminal justice, there is a moral 
 
 169. Of course, the issue of what it means for an algorithm to be “fair” is an 
entire field of inquiry on its own. Our point here is that if, according to some agreed-
upon measure of fairness, an algorithm can be shown to be fair, the argument could 
be made (though it would suffer from the problems we discuss in the text) that it does 
not matter how it works internally. 
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imperative not to foreclose access to the information that can shed 
light on why a particular prediction is made. 
C. Scientific Validity 
How valid, accurate, and widely accepted will AI-based 
presentence risk assessments be? And how does that relate to due 
process? A case relevant to answering these questions is Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., which was a 1993 Supreme Court 
ruling that considered testimony by expert witnesses.170 Daubert was 
particularly focused on the question of “whether the expert is 
proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the 
trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.”171 As the Court 
recognized, this “entails a preliminary assessment of whether the 
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically 
valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be 
applied to the facts in issue.”172 While stopping short of offering a 
“definitive checklist,” the Court identified four factors relevant to the 
inquiry: (1) “determining whether a theory or technique is scientific 
knowledge that will assist the trier of fact” by examining “whether it 
can be (and has been) tested,” (2) whether it “has been subjected to 
peer review and publication,” (3) the “known or potential rate of error 
. . . and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the 
technique’s operation,” and (4) whether the technique has experienced 
general acceptance within the scientific community.173 
As Justice Blackmun wrote in the first sentence of his opinion, 
Daubert addressed “the standard for admitting expert scientific 
testimony in a federal trial.”174 Daubert was primarily focused on 
interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which the Daubert court 
recognized as “a specific Rule that speaks to the contested issue.”175 
As noted above, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply at 
sentencing.176 With respect to techniques used to perform 
presentencing risk assessments, that means a defendant asserting a 
 
 170. 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993). 
 171. Id. at 592. 
 172. Id. at 592–93. 
 173. See id. at 593–94. 
 174. See id. at 582. 
 175. See FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588. 
 176. See discussion supra Section III.A (providing that FED. R. EVID. 
1101(d)(3) identifies sentencing as a proceeding to which “these rules—except for 
those on privilege—do not apply”). 
 Artificial Intelligence, Due Process 329 
right to a strict application of the Daubert factors would likely not be 
successful. But it is nonetheless instructive to examine AI-based risk 
assessment against that standard to see how it measures up. 
In relation to the first factor (“whether it can be (and has been) 
tested”), AI-based presentencing risk assessment comes up well 
short.177 AI-based (as opposed to the more general non-AI algorithm-
based) risk assessment is still new. In theory, of course, it is testable, 
but as far as we are aware there have not yet been any large-scale third-
party tests to assess its accuracy or reliability. In relation to the second 
factor (whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication), 
AI-based presentence risk assessment again comes up short. The 
number of peer-reviewed publications on this topic, while not zero, is 
still low.178 In noting this, we are in no way suggesting that the peer-
reviewed papers that have been published on this topic are not of high 
quality; rather, the point is that the volume of such papers is still too 
low to constitute a substantive body of work. In relation to the third 
factor (the error rate), AI-based presentence risk assessment is a 
question mark. We simply do not know how error prone it will be, or 
what sorts of factors might either exacerbate or help to minimize 
errors. There is also the issue that in algorithmic predictions, “error 
rate” can take on multiple meanings. For instance, if the prediction is 
binary, measures of error rate include the false positive rate and the 
false negative rate. An additional issue is that optimizing an algorithm 
to reduce an error rate could come at the cost of performance 
according to other statistical measures such as positive predictive 
value.179 Finally, with respect to the fourth factor (general acceptance 
within the scientific community), AI-based presentence risk 
assessment has not yet matured to the point where it has experienced 
anything near general acceptance.  
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What is clear from the above is that as things currently stand, AI-
based presentence risk assessment falls well short of the requirements 
of every one of the four Daubert factors. But does this matter given 
the lack of applicability of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to sentencing 
in federal courts (and, in many states, an analogous lack of evidentiary 
protection at sentencing)? While the evidentiary rules may be largely 
irrelevant at sentencing, the Daubert factors also relate to accuracy, 
which is highly relevant at all phases of a criminal proceeding, 
including sentencing.180 
As a thought experiment, if prosecutors were to attempt to 
introduce testimony at a trial from a person claiming to be a mind 
reader capable of knowing the thoughts in the defendant’s mind, the 
defense would obviously be able to use a Daubert motion to exclude 
the testimony.181 If the same self-professed mind reader sought to 
submit a risk assessment for consideration at a sentencing hearing, a 
defendant would just as clearly have a right to block that information, 
though he or she would probably need to object on grounds other than 
Daubert. This example matters because risk assessment algorithms 
(including but not limited to those based on AI) will span a quality 
spectrum. At one end of the spectrum they could in theory be very 
good and produce risk assessments that are highly accurate. At the 
other end of the spectrum they could be flawed—so flawed, in fact, 
that in the (theoretically) extreme case they might be producing 
random outputs, just like the purported mind reader.  
In practice, no AI-based risk assessment algorithms are likely to 
be so poorly designed as to produce what amount to random outputs. 
But that is not the end of the question because it is certainly possible 
that an algorithm might be pretty badly designed, just not so badly 
designed as to be completely random. The bottom line is that the due 
process right to not be sentenced based on materially inaccurate 
information ought to confer at least some level of protection against 
the use of underperforming risk assessment algorithms. That, in turn, 
means that a defendant should have a right to question the scientific 
validity of the specific risk assessment algorithm used to generate his 
or her risk scores. Such questions, when they are asked, will then force 
consideration of whether there should be some standard applied to 
determine prediction algorithm admissibility.  
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D. Consideration of Impermissible Factors 
At sentencing, consideration of factors such as race or 
nationality is prohibited. In United States v. Onwuemene in 1991, the 
Eighth Circuit noted that “[c]onsideration [at sentencing] of 
Onwuemene’s alien status . . . violated his constitutional rights” and 
ordered that the case be remanded for resentencing “[b]ecause we 
cannot say that the district court would have imposed the same 
sentence absent this impermissible consideration.”182 Moreover, the 
court noted that guidelines from the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
“state unequivocally that race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and 
socioeconomic status ‘are not relevant in the determination of a 
sentence.’”183  
The protections against the introduction of impermissible factors 
are no less strong even when the problematic assertions are introduced 
through the actions of the defendant’s own attorney. In 2017, the 
Supreme Court issued its decision in Buck v. Davis, which arose from 
a Texas case in which Buck was found guilty of murder.184 At the 
penalty phase of the trial, in relation to the question of whether Buck 
would likely commit future acts of violence, Buck’s own attorney 
called a psychologist as an expert witness.185 As described by the 
Court, “[t]he psychologist testified that Buck probably would not 
engage in violent conduct. But he also stated that one of the factors 
pertinent in assessing a person’s propensity for violence was his race, 
and that Buck was statistically more likely to act violently because he 
is black.”186 After the jury sentenced Buck to death, Buck filed an 
appeal, asserting that his attorney’s decision to call a witness who cited 
his race as an indicator of propensity for future violence “violated his 
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.”187 In 
finding in favor of Buck, the Court noted that Buck’s attorney had 
“specifically elicited testimony about the connection between Buck’s 
race and the likelihood of future violence” and concluded that Buck 
had “demonstrated . . . ineffective assistance of counsel.”188  
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State courts have also recognized the importance of avoiding the 
introduction of impermissible factors at sentencing. For example, in 
State v. Harris in 2010, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that  
[d]iscretion is erroneously exercised when a sentencing court actually relies 
on clearly irrelevant or improper factors, and the defendant bears the burden 
of proving such reliance by clear and convincing evidence. It is beyond 
dispute that race and gender are improper factors; they may not be relied 
upon—at all—in the imposition of a sentence.189 
This issue is of particular concern because even when a risk 
assessment algorithm is designed to specifically avoid considering 
factors such as race, socioeconomic status, etc., such factors can end 
up being implicitly included due to the data relied upon to perform the 
assessment.190 For example, the Iowa Risk Revised (IRR) tool utilizes 
inputs regarding (among other things) the defendant’s employment 
and housing status, current conviction, and any previous 
convictions—all factors that are highly impacted by historical and 
continuing patterns of racial discrimination.191 After all, it is well 
established that African Americans are disproportionately targeted 
both in policing and in the criminal justice system.192 As a result, the 
number of previous felony convictions is correlated with race.193  
It also acts, to some extent, as a proxy for socioeconomic status 
(which itself also correlates with race). Whether a person is convicted 
of a crime for which they have been arrested depends on a multiplicity 
of factors, including the resources they can put into hiring counsel for 
his or her defense. To take one example, because public defenders face 
extremely high caseloads, they can face significant pressure to 
convince their clients to agree to plea bargains.194 We have no doubt 
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that the companies that develop and sell AI-based systems for 
presentencing risk assessment will endeavor to avoid explicit 
consideration of prohibited factors such as race, nationality, or 
citizenship status. But given the extent to which this information is 
indirectly reflected through correlations with data that might be used 
by such systems, there is a very real concern that these data might act 
as an inadvertent back door through which prohibited factors might be 
considered, thereby raising due process concerns. As Huq has written, 
“the primary reason for concern with racial equity in the algorithmic 
criminal justice context is that efforts to suppress crime entrench wider 
social patterns of racial stratification.”195 These patterns, Huq writes, 
are in significant part attributable to “the asymmetrical spillovers from 
criminal justice for minority but not majority populations.”196 
IV. ALGORITHMIC RISK ASSESSMENTS: SOME KEY CASES 
Having provided the broader context for the case law relating to 
information used at sentencing, we now discuss some of the cases in 
which the use of risk assessment algorithms was itself the reason for a 
due process challenge. Importantly, at least as far as the public record 
indicates, the cases discussed in this section involved algorithms, but 
it did not involve artificial intelligence algorithms. As noted earlier, 
the dynamic nature of AI adds a significant level of both technical and 
legal complexity. That said, it is still very instructive to consider the 
case law on non-AI-based algorithms, and to consider what it might 
mean for the future when the due process challenges specific to AI 
come before the courts. 
A. State v. Loomis 
State v. Loomis is (at least to date) the most on-point case 
involving secrecy of risk assessment algorithms used in relation to 
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sentencing.197 Loomis arose from a drive-by shooting that occurred in 
La Crosse County, Wisconsin in February 2013.198 Prosecutors 
asserted that Eric Loomis was the driver of the car and charged him 
with five criminal counts.199 Loomis denied being at the scene of the 
crime, stating that he had driven the car after, but not during the 
shooting.200 Nonetheless, he pled guilty to two of the counts: 
“Attempting to Flee or Elude a Traffic Officer” and “Operating a 
Motor Vehicle without Owner’s Consent.”201 The plea agreement 
provided that the “other counts will be dismissed and read in for 
sentencing.”202 
The trial court accepted Loomis’s pleas, and in July 2013, the 
Wisconsin Department of Corrections submitted a presentence 
investigation report (PSI) that included the output from the COMPAS 
(Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative 
Sanction) risk assessment tool.203 As the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
later explained,  
COMPAS is a risk-need assessment tool designed by Northpointe, Inc. to 
provide decisional support for the Department of Corrections when making 
placement decisions, managing offenders, and planning treatment. The 
COMPAS risk assessment is based upon information gathered from the 
defendant’s criminal file and an interview with the defendant. 
A COMPAS report consists of a risk assessment designed to predict 
recidivism and a separate needs assessment for identifying program needs 
in areas such as employment, housing and substance abuse. The risk 
assessment portion of COMPAS generates risk scores displayed in the form 
of a bar chart, with three bars that represent pretrial recidivism risk, general 
recidivism risk, and violent recidivism risk. Each bar indicates a defendant’s 
level of risk on a scale of one to ten.204 
Notably, COMPAS uses a proprietary algorithm.205 Thus, while 
the output scores are available to a court, prosecutors, and the 
defendant, the specific ways in which input data were combined to 
create that output are not included in the report.206 At the August 2013 
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sentencing hearing, the state specifically referenced the COMPAS 
output, arguing that “the COMPAS report that was completed in this 
case does show the high risk and high needs of the defendant. There’s 
a high risk of violence, a high risk of recidivism, high pre-trial risk; so 
all of these are factors in determining an appropriate sentence.”207 The 
judge also referenced COMPAS, saying: 
You’re identified, through the COMPAS assessment, as an individual who 
is at high risk to the community. In terms of weighing the various factors, 
I’m ruling out probation because of the seriousness of the crime and because 
your history, your history on supervision, and the risk assessment tools that 
have been utilized, suggest that you’re extremely high risk to re-offend.208 
After Loomis was sentenced to a multiyear prison sentence, he 
filed a motion for post-conviction relief, which the trial court denied.209 
Loomis then appealed to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District IV, 
which in turn certified the appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 
specifying the question of whether using COMPAS at sentencing 
“violates a defendant’s right to due process, either because the 
proprietary nature of COMPAS prevents defendants from challenging 
the COMPAS assessment’s scientific validity, or because COMPAS 
assessments take gender into account.”210 
In a July 2016 opinion, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled 
against Loomis.211 The court conceded that “[i]f a COMPAS risk 
assessment were the determinative factor considered at sentencing this 
would raise due process challenges regarding whether a defendant 
received an individualized sentence,” but then concluded that 
“although the circuit court mentioned the COMPAS risk assessment, 
it was not determinative in deciding whether Loomis should be 
incarcerated, the severity of the sentence or whether he could be 
supervised safely and effectively in the community.”212 The court 
asserted that its “not determinative” conclusion was justified because 
the trial court “explained that its consideration of the COMPAS risk 
scores was supported by other independent factors”213 and because 
those scores were used by the trial court as “‘an observation’ to 
reinforce its assessment of the other factors it considered.”214  
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court also addressed the use of gender 
information in COMPAS, writing that “there is a factual basis 
underlying COMPAS’s use of gender in calculating risk scores,” that 
“any risk assessment tool which fails to differentiate between men and 
women will misclassify both genders,” and concluding “[t]hus, if the 
inclusion of gender promotes accuracy, it serves the interests of 
institutions and defendants, rather than a discriminatory purpose.”215 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court also considered the more general 
question of the appropriateness of the use of COMPAS at sentencing, 
writing: 
[A] sentencing court may consider a COMPAS risk assessment at 
sentencing subject to the following limitations. As recognized by the 
Department of Corrections, the PSI instructs that risk scores may not be 
used: (1) to determine whether an offender is incarcerated; or (2) to 
determine the severity of the sentence. Additionally, risk scores may not be 
used as the determinative factor in deciding whether an offender can be 
supervised safely and effectively in the community. 
Importantly, a circuit court must explain the factors in addition to a 
COMPAS risk assessment that independently support the sentence 
imposed. A COMPAS risk assessment is only one of many factors that may 
be considered and weighed at sentencing. Any Presentence Investigation 
Report (‘PSI’) containing a COMPAS risk assessment filed with the court 
must contain a written advisement listing the limitations.216 
In October 2016, Loomis filed a petition with the U.S. Supreme 
Court, asking the Court to consider the question:  
Is it a violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to due process for a trial 
court to rely on such risk assessment results at sentencing: because the 
proprietary nature of COMPAS prevents a defendant from challenging the 
accuracy and scientific validity of the risk assessment; and . . .because 
COMPAS assessments take gender and race into account in formulating the 
risk assessment.217 
In opposing the petition, the State of Wisconsin identified the 
question presented as “[d]oes a trial court violate a criminal 
defendant’s due-process rights at sentencing when it considers—but 
does not base the sentence upon—an evidence-based recidivism-risk 
assessment?”218 The State argued that “[t]he use of risk assessments by 
sentencing courts is a novel issue, which needs time for further 
percolation” and that in Loomis, the trial court “merely used COMPAS 
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to ‘corroborat[e]’ the evaluation it had already made using the 
sentencing factors, and was well aware of COMPAS’s limitations.”219 
The United States also submitted an amicus brief opposing the 
petition, conceding that a “sentencing court’s use of actuarial risk 
assessments raises novel constitutional questions that may merit this 
Court’s attention in a future case.”220 But the brief also argued that 
“this case is an unsuitable vehicle for review because the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court concluded, as the sentencing judge stated, that the trial 
court would have imposed the same sentence absent any consideration 
of petitioner’s COMPAS risk scores. The petition therefore should be 
denied.”221 In June 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition.222 
One of the stranger paradoxes illustrated by Loomis concerns 
assertions that due process was not implicated because the risk 
assessments purportedly had no impact on sentencing. The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court wrote that “although the circuit court mentioned the 
COMPAS risk assessment, it was not determinative in deciding 
whether Loomis should be incarcerated, the severity of the sentence 
or whether he could be supervised safely and effectively in the 
community.”223 To suggest that the inclusion of a risk assessment in a 
PSIR is acceptable only when it has no impact on sentencing leaves 
open the question of why the risk assessment was used at all. After all, 
the main goal of a sentencing proceeding is to determine whether and 
for how long a convicted defendant should be incarcerated—or, 
alternatively, whether the defendant can be effectively supervised in 
the community. 
B. Malenchik v. State 
Malenchik v. State was a 2010 Indiana Supreme Court ruling that 
upheld the use of risk assessment tools at sentencing.224 Before 
discussing the specifics of Malenchik, it is relevant to note that two 
years earlier, in Rhodes v. State, the Indiana Court of Appeals had 
upheld a defendant’s challenge to the use of the Level of Service 
Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) risk assessment tool in relation to 
 
 219. Id. at 1, 9 (citations omitted). 
 220. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, Loomis, 137 S. Ct. 
2290 (2017) (No. 16-6387).  
 221. Id. at 13. 
 222. See Loomis v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (denying cert.). 
 223. 881 N.W.2d 749, 771 (Wis. 2016). 
 224. See generally Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564 (Ind. 2010). 
338 Michigan State Law Review  2020 
sentencing.225 In Rhodes, the Indiana Court of Appeals had found that 
“[t]he use of a standardized scoring model, such as the LSI-R, 
undercuts the trial court’s responsibility to craft an appropriate, 
individualized sentence” and concluded that it was “an abuse of 
discretion to rely on scoring models to determine a sentence.”226  
In Malenchik, the Indiana Supreme Court cited the Indiana Court 
of Appeals’ conclusion in Rhodes and then wrote,  
[w]e disagree. As noted above, there is a growing body of impressive 
research supporting the widespread use and efficacy of evidence-based 
offender assessment tools. The results of such testing can enhance a trial 
judge’s individualized evaluation of the sentencing evidence and selection 
of the program of penal consequences most appropriate for the reformation 
of a particular offender . . . We defer to the sound discernment and discretion 
of trial judges to give the tools proper consideration and appropriate weight. 
We disapprove of the resistance to LSI-R test results expressed by the Court 
of Appeals in Rhodes.227 
C. People v. Younglove 
People v. Younglove was a 2019 decision from the Court of 
Appeals of Michigan and arose from a set of consolidated appeals 
challenging the use of COMPAS.228 The defendants asserted “their 
respective sentencing courts’ presumed use of the COMPAS 
information in the PSIRs when determining their sentences deprived 
them of the due process of law.”229 More specifically, the defendants 
asserted that “because COMPAS statistically analyzes data from a 
general population in making its determinations . . . its use [is] 
inappropriate in an individualized sentencing decision,” and that 
COMPAS “has discriminatory impacts as concerns race and gender 
inputs, and that the scores it produces lack transparency.”230 The court 
rejected the due process claim, writing that  
the references to COMPAS in defendants’ PSIRs, despite reflecting a 
software program’s projections about future behavior, are similar to the 
opinions of probation agents that are routinely included in PSIRs . . . 
Therefore, we are not persuaded by defendants’ arguments that the 
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inclusion of COMPAS information unfairly influences or replaces a 
sentencing court’s individual sentencing discretion.231 
V. AI AND CRIMINAL RISK ASSESSMENT: THREE GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES 
In this section we introduce three principles that we believe 
should guide the use of AI in presentence risk assessments. As 
discussed above, due process requires that a defendant not be 
sentenced based on materially inaccurate information. Securing that 
right requires ensuring that defendants have at least the possibility of 
pursuing a claim of material inaccuracy associated with either the data 
used to compute an algorithmic risk score or the algorithm used to 
compute risk scores based on that data. That, in turn, means that the 
algorithm and data associated with generating risk assessments must 
be archived and, as appropriate, made available to defendants. These 
requirements lead directly to the principles of auditability and 
transparency, both of which pertain to snapshots of how an AI system 
operates in relation to individual defendants. 
There is also the question of how the algorithm operates in 
relation to defendants as a group, and in particular whether there is 
evidence that might support a claim of either (1) material inaccuracy 
or (2) bias arising from impermissible use of factors such as race.232 
This leads to the principle of consistency. The following sections 
describe each of these three principles in more detail. 
A. Principle #1: Auditability 
Auditability, as the term is used in this Article, refers to 
preserving all of the information that was used to perform a risk 
assessment so that it can potentially be accessed in the event of a due 
process challenge. This involves three distinct categories of 
information.233 The first category is non-defendant-specific data that is 
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used by the algorithm. For instance, this could include the historical 
recidivism rate for people found guilty of similar crimes in the state 
where the trial took place. A statistic like this might evolve slowly 
(e.g., if it is recalculated once a year and conveyed to the AI system 
through an annual upgrade) or quickly (if the AI system monitors 
databases of trials and convictions and automatically updates the 
recidivism rate data in response to information about new 
convictions). 
The second category of information is data specific to the 
defendant, such as the defendant’s arrest history.234 In providing this 
example, we are not offering an opinion that the number of prior 
felony convictions is necessarily a bias-free input to a risk assessment 
algorithm. In fact, there is a good case to be made that it is problematic, 
given that it can be influenced by factors (e.g., racial bias, the level of 
policing in the neighborhood where the defendant lives, etc.) that are 
not specific to the individual being evaluated.  
The third category of information is the algorithm itself—i.e., 
the specific mathematical and logical processes that were used to 
combine the data in the first two categories in order to produce an 
assessment. Since an AI algorithm can evolve very quickly, if there is 
no specific effort to record the state of the algorithm every time it is 
used, it could be difficult or impossible to reconstruct it at a later time. 
In sum, the “snapshot” that would be recorded each time the algorithm 
is run would comprise a complete tally of all three categories of 
information, thus enabling the exact same assessment, using the exact 
same data, to be performed again at a later time, with a guarantee that 
it would produce the same output.  
In relation to auditability, it is also relevant to consider practical 
issues relating to how and by whom this information would be stored. 
One initial question is whether the resulting file sizes would be 
problematic. Our view is that this would not be an issue. As noted 
above, there are three categories of information. The first category 
(non-defendant-specific data) and second category (defendant-
specific data) would consume only a very small storage volume in 
light of current and future storage capacities. Many algorithms are 
likely to use no more than (and often much fewer than) a few dozen 
inputs in each of these categories.235 The total data volume needed to 
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record those parameters would be negligible. To take a specific 
example, suppose that a particular algorithm used 100 distinct pieces 
of information across the two categories of non-defendant-specific 
data and defendant-specific data. Suppose further that each piece of 
information required an average of forty bytes to store. This 
corresponds to a total of four thousand bytes—which is essentially free 
to store given today’s technology environment. 
One way to store an algorithm is to store the complete set of code 
for implementing it.236 The advantage of storing an algorithm this way 
is that it can easily be run again either to replicate its performance on 
inputs that it had used in the past or to explore its performance on new 
inputs.237 The downside of storing algorithms in the form in which they 
are actually implemented on computers is that code can be very 
difficult for humans to read. This is particularly the case for code that 
was written not by humans but by other code, which will occur with 
increasing frequency as AI-based systems become more advanced. 
This is because AI algorithms will, in some cases, quite literally write 
their own code, and will of course do so without regard for how 
human-readable it might be. 
An alternative approach is through the use of “pseudocode,” 
which is commonly used in the field of computer science to record 
algorithms in a form that is human readable and also easy to convert 
back into computer code should the need arise.238 Of course, since 
pseudocode is a representation of the actual code, it would be 
important to ensure that there was no divergence—i.e., that the 
pseudocode accurately represents what the actual code did. Whether 
an algorithm was stored directly by simply archiving a literal copy of 
the code or indirectly by automatically generating and then storing 
pseudocode, the data volume involved in storing the algorithm would 
likely be higher than that needed to store the first two categories of 
information (the non-defendant-specific data and defendant-specific 
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data), but still very modest in a world where it is now possible to 
purchase a four terabyte external disk drive for under $100.239  
While data volume (and therefore storage capacity or cost) 
would not be an impediment, there is a separate question about where 
this information would be stored. One approach is for companies that 
produce the risk assessment software to also take responsibility for 
archiving the data and algorithms. This has the advantage of placing 
responsibility for managing storage with the entity that knows the 
software and data best, but it also raises complex issues of compliance 
and verification. Another (non-mutually exclusive) possibility would 
be for this information to become a standard digital appendix to 
presentence investigation reports. This would ensure that the 
information was directly linked to a defendant’s file. Companies 
would undoubtedly object to the storage of algorithm information in 
unencrypted form, but this objection could be mitigated through the 
use of encryption and a suitable accompanying plan for managing 
decryption keys.  
Yet another potential issue is what Selbst and Barocas have 
termed algorithmic “inscrutability,” which they describe as “a 
situation in which the rules that govern decision-making are so 
complex, numerous, and interdependent that they defy practical 
inspection and resist comprehension.”240 It is certainly possible that 
when AI-based systems (including those used for risk assessment) 
become advanced enough, they will acquire a complexity that creates 
substantive challenges to understanding what they are doing. We are 
cautiously optimistic that, at least in the relatively near time horizon, 
and in the very narrow domain we are addressing, this will not be an 
insurmountable challenge. As an initial matter, many AI-enabled risk 
assessment algorithms will not be so complex as to elude human 
scrutiny. And for the subset of those that are, it will not always be 
necessary to understand every single thing that they are doing. It might 
be sufficient to obtain an understanding that, while not fully complete, 
is sufficient to confirm or rebut a particular due process concern.  
It is also possible to use algorithms to evaluate algorithms. In 
other words, an algorithm that might appear to be inscrutable under 
direct inspection by a human might, when viewed by another 
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algorithm specifically designed to understand complex systems, be 
more amenable to analysis. More generally, while recognizing the 
importance of both research and scholarship relating to the broader 
issue of highly complex, machine-generated algorithms, our call for 
auditability is somewhat more modest: We are arguing that the 
information about an algorithm used to perform a presentence risk 
assessment should be archived, thus creating at least the possibility 
that it can be analyzed at a later date in relation to due process 
concerns. And, in the specific context of algorithmic criminal risk 
assessment, we are confident that for at least the near-term future, the 
primary obstacles for algorithmic understanding will lie in the 
practical questions relating to how the algorithm is stored and who has 
access to it. 
B. Principle #2: Transparency  
While auditability refers to ensuring that the information used in 
computing a risk assessment is archived, transparency refers to 
ensuring that it can be accessed.241 The broader concept of algorithm 
transparency is not new, though there are some domain-specific 
features for how it would need to operate in the criminal justice 
context. Companies that produce risk assessment software will have 
very reasonable concerns about preserving the trade secret aspects of 
their algorithms, as those might be key factors in ensuring an 
advantage over competitors in the market. Thus, they would 
legitimately object to a requirement that the audit information simply 
be published on the internet. Yet it would also be unreasonable for 
companies to assert that trade secret protection precludes any 
possibility of access by a defendant to the audit information, as this 
would surely violate a defendant’s right to due process. Put simply, 
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trade secret rights of companies that make risk assessment software 
should not come at the expense of due process rights of defendants.242  
One way to resolve the tension between the due process rights 
of defendants and the trade secret rights of companies that make risk 
assessment software is through tools such as protective orders, which 
are commonly used in relation to trade secrets in civil litigation.243 
While this offers a procedural way forward, mapping the methods 
used to protect trade secrets in civil litigation into a criminal context 
would be financially prohibitive for many defendants. For example, it 
is common in patent infringement cases for attorneys and technology 
experts working on behalf of the plaintiff to gain access to a 
defendant’s data, source code, and other trade secret information.244 
The protective orders in such cases are often quite elaborate and 
complying with them can require significant resources.245 To take one 
example, protective orders in patent cases where source code is 
alleged to infringe a patent often require that the defendant produce 
source code on a standalone, non-internet-connected computer so that 
experts working on behalf of a plaintiff can inspect or review it. 
Typically, the dedicated room is located at the offices of the law firm 
representing the defendant. In many instances the source code 
computer must be made available for long periods of time (weeks or 
months). In some cases, at any time when a representative of the 
plaintiff is in the room with the source code computer, a staff member 
from the defendant’s law firm must be assigned to be physically 
present in an adjacent room. 
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While the costs for the resources described above can be borne 
by companies engaged in patent litigation, they would clearly be 
prohibitive for many defendants in criminal cases. But such costs 
would be within the capacity of civil rights and criminal justice 
advocacy organizations. One solution could therefore be for such an 
organization to underwrite the costs of pursuing a due process claim, 
providing the resources to cover the costs of complying with the 
protective order. A successful due process claim would benefit not 
only the particular defendant(s) on behalf of whom the claim was 
initially brought, but also a much larger group of defendants who were 
subject to risk assessments using the same or similar algorithm 
approaches. 
We recognize that a requirement to make proprietary 
information accessible—even with the safeguards conferred by 
protective orders—will not be welcomed by companies that make risk 
assessment tools.246 As Rebecca Wexler wrote in a 2018 law review 
article, “Developers often assert that details about how their tools 
function are trade secrets. As a result, they claim entitlements to 
withhold that information from criminal defendants and their 
attorneys, refusing to comply even with those subpoenas that seek 
information under a protective order and under seal.”247 However, just 
as routinely occurs in certain types of civil litigation involving 
protective orders to protect trade secrets, a company that sells risk 
assessment solutions and has trade secrets to protect can be compelled 
by the court to produce the relevant information.248 Thus, we are not 
arguing that trade secret law should be inapplicable in this context; to 
the contrary, we believe that companies that make risk assessment 
software have the right to safeguard their trade secret rights, just as do 
companies in other markets. When proper protections are in place, it 
is well established in other areas of law that trade secret rights can be 
protected while still conferring controlled, limited access by outside 
parties.249 The same should hold true in relation to algorithms 
underlying risk assessments. 
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It is also important to address another concern that might arise 
in relation to calls for transparency: Could the availability of 
information about an AI-based risk assessment algorithm be used to 
game the system? In other words, could defendants with 
foreknowledge of the inner workings of the algorithm attempt to 
construct a set of input data aimed at generating a more favorable 
assessment than is objectively merited? In theory, this could occur, but 
the opportunities for this type of manipulation can be minimized 
through appropriate algorithm design approaches. For instance, one 
technique that would help would be to ensure that the required 
algorithm inputs are forms of data that are not overly subjective and 
thus more easily susceptible to manipulation. 
Finally, it is also important to acknowledge that transparency has 
limits.250 Consider a defendant who asks how an algorithm works and 
is then given tens of thousands of lines of source code. Under some 
definitions this might satisfy a transparency requirement, but it could 
still leave the defendant largely in the dark about the operation of the 
algorithm.251 As Joshua Kroll et al. have observed, while “full or 
partial transparency can be a helpful tool for governance in many cases 
. . . transparency alone is not sufficient to provide accountability in all 
cases.”252 Similarly, Barocas and Selbst have written that “[t]he 
problem . . . is greater than disclosure; in the absence of the specialized 
knowledge required to understand source code, disclosure may offer 
little value to affected parties and regulators.”253 Mike Ananny and 
Kate Crawford have observed that “transparency is an inadequate way 
to understand—much less govern—algorithms.”254 Cynthia Stohl et al. 
have written that one consequence of transparency requirements could 
be “strategic opacity” achieved through releasing very large amounts 
of information.255 As a result, “unimportant pieces of information will 
take so much time and effort to sift through that receivers will be 
distracted from the central information the actor wishes to conceal.”256 
The skepticism about transparency conveyed in the foregoing is 
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warranted. However, whatever the shortcomings of transparency may 
be, it certainly provides much more information than algorithmic 
secrecy. In short, while it may be possible to imagine circumstances 
under which due process remains elusive even in the presence of 
transparency, it is hard to see how due process can be present when a 
defendant is denied access to the workings of the algorithm. 
C. Principle #3: Consistency 
The principle of consistency aims to identify and avoid the issue 
of substantively different prediction outputs arising from similar 
inputs that occur at different times. This concern arises due to the 
dynamic nature of AI algorithms, which can automatically change 
over time as they learn.257 As a consequence, this means that the same 
inputs, presented to the system at two different times, might lead to 
different outputs. To see why this is a potential due process concern, 
consider two different defendants with identical (with regard to all of 
the defendant-specific inputs to the risk assessment tool) profiles who 
are subject to algorithmic risk assessments. The first defendant is 
evaluated in March, and the second defendant is evaluated six months 
later in October. 
In “traditional” (non-AI-based) algorithmic risk assessments, the 
risk score in both cases will be the same, because the underlying 
algorithm will be the same.258 But with AI-based systems, the 
algorithm might have evolved. Suppose that due to the learning over 
the intervening six months, the algorithm improves. Suppose further 
that the first defendant is scored as high risk and the second defendant, 
who is scored using the improved version of the algorithm, is 
classified as medium risk. The first defendant would have a due 
process claim arising from a material inaccuracy (the “high risk” 
classification), since he or she was in effect penalized by being 
evaluated using an earlier, less advanced (and accurate) version of the 
algorithm. In making this observation, we are not suggesting that 
improvements in the accuracy of an algorithm are a bad thing—in fact, 
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it is obviously beneficial if an algorithm can become more accurate. 
However, defendants should be able to seek relief if they were 
assessed by an algorithm that, with the benefit of hindsight, gave them 
a materially higher risk score than they deserved. 
In calling for consistency, we are not suggesting that, every 
single time any minor algorithmic update occurs, it is necessary to go 
back and reexamine and recompute every prior risk assessment that 
was computed by earlier versions of the algorithm. In the limiting case 
of dynamic AI algorithms that self-update as frequently as every few 
days, this would lead to a completely impractical result of essentially 
requiring a continuous recalculation of all prior risk scores. Rather, we 
are highlighting the importance of being attentive to truly large-scale 
changes in the algorithms that have highly consequential impacts on 
the resulting risk assessments—and therefore, potentially on the 
sentences that were handed down at proceedings that considered those 
assessments. To take an extreme example, suppose that a major 
software flaw that substantially overstated risk was identified in an 
algorithm. Of course, one necessary step would be to fix the flaw. But 
an equally necessary step would be to examine previous assessments 
made with the old software to see how those assessments would have 
been different had the new software been used at the time of 
sentencing. 
We are also cognizant of the point that, as Richard Re has 
observed, “the courts are heavily motivated by an aversion to 
‘technological exceptionalism.’”259 In other words, why should courts 
make an exception to address technology-induced inconsistencies, 
particularly in light of the many human-induced inconsistencies that 
undoubtedly arose in the past in relation to pre-algorithmic 
presentence risk assessments? We certainly would not argue that 
courts should be required to track and react to every tweak in a risk-
assessment algorithm that might generate results displaying some 
level of inconsistency with previous outputs. But we would also argue 
that while algorithmic approaches certainly have potential 
disadvantages including those discussed herein, one of their clear 
advantages is that their digital nature makes it far easier to identify 
inconsistencies. If those inconsistencies become sufficiently glaring, 
we think it would be a mistake for courts to turn a blind eye to them 
simply on the grounds that addressing them would represent a 
departure from approaches developed in a pre-digital era. 
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To examine consistency, it is not necessary to record the 
algorithm. It is only necessary to have a record of the input data and 
output risk scores for a large number of defendants over time. Such a 
record should be generated and retained so that it can be examined in 
the future to screen for some of the potential concerns identified 
above. Compliance with this principle would not raise the same level 
of trade secret concerns that arise in relation to the transparency 
principle discussed above, since it does not require any disclosure of 
the algorithm. Recording this input/output information will also make 
it easier to study the impact of potential correlations in the data used 
to produce risk assessments. 
It is important to emphasize that consistency in the sense 
discussed here is related to but distinct from the concept of fairness. 
We have not specifically identified “fairness” as one of the principles 
because it is self-evident that algorithms used in relation to sentencing 
(and more generally) should be fair. Of course, there is enormous 
room for debate regarding what it means for an algorithm to be fair 
and how fairness should be measured. Our call for consistency is more 
modest, in that it recognizes the problems that would arise if a single 
set of input data, if applied as input to a prediction algorithm 
repeatedly on multiple occasions, could give rise to a variety of 
different output criminal risk scores just based on the randomness of 
when the prediction is performed. 
That said, the same tools to compare large sets of inputs with 
their corresponding outputs that can be used to evaluate consistency 
can also be valuable in providing insights into fairness. As Chander 
has observed, “Even a transparent, facially neutral algorithm can still 
produce discriminatory results. What we need instead is a 
transparency of inputs and results, which allows us to see that the 
algorithm is generating discriminatory impact.”260 Chander has also 
written that “the problem is not the black box, which is often more 
neutral than the human decisionmaker it replaces, but the real world 
on which it operates.”261 We would go further, arguing that the 
potential for bias exists not only in the data but also in an initially 
unbiased algorithm that might evolve in the future in a manner that 
introduces bias into the calculations. We also underscore that this sort 
of evolution is not inevitable. But the fact that it is possible means that 
measures to detect it need to be in place. 
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The records created in relation to the consistency principle 
would also, as an ancillary benefit, provide information that would be 
useful if there are concerns that an algorithm is making decisions that 
could run afoul of antidiscrimination frameworks that prohibit 
disparate treatment and disparate impact. AI uses data to identify 
correlations—including subtle correlations that can only be teased out 
through highly detailed mathematical analysis—to exploit in 
furthering an objective such as the accuracy of a prediction.262 
Correlations observed in the data may at times reflect a true underlying 
attribute relating to propensity towards recidivism, and therefore may 
be properly considered in a risk assessment algorithm. Or, they may 
be deceptive consequences of a combination of factors well outside 
the scope of data available to the AI system. In a pre-digital context, a 
caution against an overreliance on purported correlations can be found 
in the Supreme Court’s 1976 Craig v. Boren decision, which 
considered an Oklahoma statute codifying a gender-based differential 
regarding the minimum age to purchase alcoholic beverages.263 The 
Court found the statute to be in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, holding that “the principles embodied in the Equal 
Protection Clause are not to be rendered inapplicable by statistically 
measured but loose-fitting generalities concerning the drinking 
tendencies of aggregate groups.”264 There are many “loose-fitting 
generalities” that might be inferred from the massive amounts of data 
that are now available regarding nearly everyone, including people 
who are in the criminal justice system. The information recorded 
under the “consistency” principle can help serve as a bulwark against 
improper uses of apparent correlations. 
D. The Three Principles and Due Process 
As the Supreme Court explained in 1976 in Mathews v. Eldridge, 
“Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental 
decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests 
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or 
Fourteenth Amendment.”265 Mathews arose from a challenge to the 
constitutionality of terminating Social Security disability benefits 
without an evidentiary hearing.266 While this dispute did not arise in a 
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criminal justice context, the Mathews Court articulated a test that 
applies to due process more broadly: “[O]ur prior decisions,” the 
Court wrote,  
indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally 
requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that 
will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, finally, 
the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.267 
The balancing test in Mathews clearly weighs in favor of the 
three proposed principles of “auditability,” “transparency,” and 
“consistency” discussed above. With respect to the first Mathews 
factor, in criminal sentencing, the “private interest” at stake is 
liberty—or, in capital cases, life—which is clearly a private interest of 
the utmost importance. The second factor addresses the “the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used” 
and the value of additional procedural safeguards.268 If an inaccurate 
(in the sense of being erroneously high by a material amount) risk 
assessment is used at sentencing, the potential that the defendant will 
receive a more severe sentence as a result is substantial. The three 
principles can help avoid this injustice and thus, to use the language 
of Mathews, are “procedural safeguards” with high “probable 
value.”269  
The third factor relates to the burden on the government that 
would accompany the additional safeguards.270 Enabling 
“auditability,” “transparency,” and “consistency” would place an 
additional burden on the government, which would need to provide an 
opportunity for defendants to gain access to information about the 
methods used to evaluate criminal risk. However, compared with the 
overall complexity of administering a trial (including all of the 
associated pre- and post-trial motions, scheduling issues, etc.), the 
marginal burden would be modest.   
In addition, while the third prong of the Mathews balancing test 
relates to the burden on government, it is worth noting that adoption 
of the three principles would also place an additional burden on the 
 
 267. Id. at 334–35. 
 268. Id. at 335. 
 269. Id. 
 270. See id. 
352 Michigan State Law Review  2020 
private companies that provide risk assessment software.271 For 
instance, those companies would need to negotiate the language of 
protective orders and then provide access to the relevant algorithmic 
information under the resulting protective orders. The costs associated 
with this compliance would end up getting priced into the products 
and get therefore passed on to governments. Thus, a fair analysis of 
the burden on government would also need to recognize the indirect 
effect of those costs. In short, risk assessment tools would be slightly 
more expensive—but at the same time, used in a manner much more 
consistent with the due process. We think that is a good tradeoff to 
make. 
Finally, it is important to address what might be viewed as an 
inconsistency in the types of information to which access would need 
to be provided in accordance with the three principles: In relation to 
“auditability” and “transparency,” we highlight the importance of 
access to the algorithm, while in discussing “consistency,” we 
emphasize the utility of examining input/output information, without 
necessarily knowing the specifics of the algorithm. These differences 
arise from two different consequences of the need for due process. 
“Auditability” and “transparency” are a response to the potential 
problems raised by algorithmic secrecy. In our view, a defendant’s 
right to be sentenced based on information that is not materially 
inaccurate and in a manner that does not impermissibly rely on factors 
such as race precludes secrecy (from the defendant).272 A defendant 
also has a due process right not to be subject to discrimination (relative 
to other defendants) based on a factor such as race.273 To examine that 
issue, the inquiry can be effective with only the input/output 
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information (assuming there is a sufficient amount of it to be 
statistically significant).274 
CONCLUSION 
When used properly, AI has the potential to bring important 
benefits to criminal risk assessments, including those used in relation 
to sentencing. At least in theory, AI can operate in a manner free from 
the many human biases that have impacted risk assessments in the 
past. AI-based risk assessments also have the potential to be fairer, 
more consistent, and more objective than methods used in the past. 
Yet AI also brings the risk of incorporating and even amplifying 
the very same biases it could in principle avoid, either through the 
reliance on data that has bias built into it or through natively generated 
biases, including those arising from mistaking correlation with 
causation.275 And, despite the best intentions of their designers, AI-
based systems might at times produce inaccurate risk assessments, 
either due to problems with the input data or to the algorithms 
operating on that data.276 
Due process needs to be a central concern when introducing AI-
enabled risk assessments into the criminal justice system. While there 
is as of yet no case law specific to AI-enabled risk assessments, as 
discussed earlier in this Article, there is a large body of case law on 
the broader question of what information can be considered at 
sentencing, as well as a nascent body of case law on algorithmic 
(though not AI-based) risk assessment. In some respects, the case law 
is inconclusive, leaving it unclear exactly what specific level of due 
process applies at sentencing. However, there is also a clear and 
unambiguous floor: Defendants have at least the right not to be 
sentenced based on materially inaccurate information or on 
impermissible information such as race.277 
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In light of this floor and of the dynamic nature of the algorithms 
that will be a feature of AI-based risk assessment systems, we have 
proposed three key principles that can help safeguard due process in 
sentencing. The first principle, auditability, ensures that a snapshot of 
the information used to perform the risk assessment is archived. The 
second principle, transparency, allows that information to be accessed 
by defendants in a manner that also protects the trade secrets of the 
manufacturer of the risk assessment system. The final principle, 
consistency, aims to provide an additional lens through which to 
examine issues including (1) whether impermissible factors such as 
race are entering into the analysis, and (2) whether defendants with 
substantially identical profiles are, at different times, being given 
substantially different risk scores. 
If AI is to be a positive force in promoting equity in sentencing—
and we believe that, with proper protections and attention to due 
process, it can—then it will be important to ensure that risk scores are 
not corrupted by bias, flawed data, flawed algorithms, or flawed 
assumptions. That will be much easier to do if the safeguards we have 
identified here are adopted and upheld. 
 
